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INTRODUCTION 
Since 1980, the government of the Republic of Zambia 
country's agricultural sector. In the face of declining 
copper production and copper prices, the government is 
counting on increased agricultural export and food crop 
production to reduce food" imports and to improve foreign 
exchange earnings. 
Extensive price and market controls that existed 
throughout the 1970s, which are still prevalent in the '80s 
although operating with greater flexibility and substantial 
changes, were largely ineffective in increasing agricultural 
production to meet domestic needs and export objectives. 
Increasing grain imports and the continuous decline of 
tobacco and groundnuts production - the country's most 
important agricultural export commodities - provide dramatic 
examples of the inability of the agricultural sector to 
respond to National needs. 
Much of the poor agricultural production record -
declining trend in per capita output of food and export 
production in the 1970s and early 1980s - is attributed to 
inappropriate agricultural policies and inadequate policy 
implementation capacity (70, p. ii). Agricultural specific 
policy inadequacies have been re-inforced by such macro-
economic policies as over-valued domestic currency to 
provide reduced incentives for producers of agricultural 
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commodités. 
Although simultaneous improvement in several key policy 
areas in. the agricultural sector are necessary for better 
production performance, reforms in the existing agricultural 
pricing and marketing policies are considered most critical, 
at least in the short term, to increases in production. 
Pricing policy has been a central issue in many proposals 
for policy changes put forward by major donor agencies. 
Country perspective reports by major donor agencies and 
other studies have often compared the existing domestic 
prices with their equivalent import or export parity values. 
Divergencies between domestic producer prices and their 
equivalent import or export parity values and the implied 
protection, incentive and efficiency implications are well 
documented in these reports and studies for the pre-1980 
years (Dodge (24); World Bank (70)). However, there is no 
documentation of the quantitative changes in output supply, 
input demand and the extent to which the attainment of 
stated government objectives were impaired because of these 
divergencies. The general conclusions drawn by these 
reports and studies are that producers of most agricultural 
products were implicitly taxed while consumers were 
subsidized through the price control mechanism in the 
pre-1980 years. The existing price control mechanism also 
resulted in inefficiencies in the operations of the public 
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marketing, credit and other agricultural related 
institutions. It should be pointed out that although the 
above studies tended to emphasize the effficiency 
implication of the existing price structure, there is little 
evidence from the government's policy objectives and 
decisions made in the 1970s to suggest that efficiency 
considerations were of major concern then to the policy 
makers. Perhaps, the pricing policies that were pursued 
were not designed to be efficient in the first place. 
Regional pricing based on equivalent import and export 
parity values and increased private participation in 
agricultural markets underly recent recommended policy 
changes by major donor agencies (67). There seem to be some 
positive movement by the government regarding increased 
private participation in agricultural markets, bringing 
domestic prices more in line with their equivalent border 
prices and other policy reforms. Since 1983/84 production 
season, officially announced producer prices for several 
crops are closely in line with their border price equivalent 
values. Further evidence of future policy changes along 
these lines include agreement by the government, at least in 
principle, with major donor agencies to adopt a pricing 
methodology utilizing border price concepts, to allow 
private traders to enter the maize market, to raise and 
gradually decontrol agricultural consumer prices, to 
4 
implement a phased elimination of consumer, fertilizer and 
other commodity subsidies (67). Although the policy reforms 
above represent significant departures from the historical 
pricing policies, the thorny and perhaps the most important 
pricing issue of 'Uniform Pricing' is largely untouched. 
There is little indication that the government will be 
willing to replace the existing uniform pricing strategy 
with a regional pricing strategy soon. 
Zambia agriculture has important livestock and crop 
sectors. However, there is little data on livestock 
activities that can be used for any meaningful analytical 
work. This study will therefore be limited to the impacts 
of the government's pricing policies on the crop sector. 
The production and consumption effects of government 
agricultural policy choices in Zambia are both important to 
be studied systematically and in detail. However, in this 
study, formal modelling activities will be concentrated on 
the production side of the crop sector where reasonable 
amount of data are available. There is serious lack of 
consumption data of any kind on agricultural commodities in 
Zambia. As a result, crop consumption activities will be 
handled informally in this study, using very simple 
procedures and assumptions where needed to determine, for 
example, the quantities of agricultural commodities 
consumed. 
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Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the impacts 
of the government's pricing policy on agricultural 
production and the achievement of government policy 
objectives. The following pricing issues will be examined: 
1. Producer equivalent import-export parity pricing 
as an alternative to the existing producer price 
regime. The intention here is to demonstrate 
whether import-export parity pricing is likely to 
enhance the achievement of government 
agricultural policy objectives. This is a useful 
exercise inview of the fact that border pricing 
concepts are major features of price policy 
changes recommended by donor agencies which may 
provide the basis for future pricing of 
agricultural commodities in Zambia. 
2. Fertilizer subsidy and improved maize price as 
alternative strategies for achieving the 
objectives of food self-sufficiency and increased 
agricultural export production. Maize and 
fertilizer are the major agricultural produce and 
input respectively in Zambia. The price levels 
of these two commodities have profound political 
and national budgetary implications. Maize is 
the universal diet in Zambia. There are large 
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subsidies related to the production, distribution 
and consumption of maize and fertilizer in 
Zambia. Availability of maize in sufficient 
quantity and reasonable price contribute 
positively toward political stability. 
Production of maize from the commercial farm 
sector, accounting for some 40 percent of total 
marketed production of maize, relies heavily on 
subsidized fertilizer which has become a major 
government expenditure item over the years. 
The evaluation exercise above will require prediction 
of the effect of alternative set of prices on production 
variables. It is therefore necessary to know the price 
response parameters of the commodities involved. Thus, the 
first task will be the estimation of the relevant price 
response parameters which will make it possible to predict 
the outcome of production variables of interest under 
alternative pricing strategies. 
r'or the purpose of this study the following definitions 
will be adopted: 
1. POLICY - officially adopted solution to a 
problem. 
2. IMPACT - refers to the changes in output supply, 
input demand and associated monetary variables 
caused by a given pricing strategy and the extent 
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to which these changes meet the government 
agricultural policy objectives. 
Outline of the Study 
The study has two parts although it is not formally 
divided as such. The first part deals with the estimation 
of price elasticities of output supply and input demand. 
The second part examines the real and monetary impacts of 
alternative pricing strategies and the extent to which 
government agricultural policy objectives are achieved. 
The contents of specific chapters are as follows: 
Chapter 1 contains the general introduction to the study, 
statement of the objectives of the study, outline of the 
study, and review of studies and methodologies for 
evaluating agricultural pricing and market intervention 
policies. Chapter 2 discusses the policy context including 
general economic and agricultural policies, existing 
agricultural production technology, agricultural subsidies, 
research and extension services, recent policy changes and 
market behavior of producers. Chapter 3 concerns the 
development of a framework for estimating elasticity 
parameters and determining the real and monetary impacts of 
alternative pricing strategies. Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical estimation of elasticity parameters. Chapter 5 
contains the real and monetary impacts of selected pricing 
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strategies, and further model development. Chapter 6 is 
about the implications of results and conclusions of the 
study. Data on outputs, inputs and prices used for the 
study appear in the Appendix. 
Review of Methodologies and Studies on Evaluation of 
Agricultural Pricing and Market Intervention Policies 
Several studies on agricultural pricing and market 
intervention policies in developing countries point out that 
farmers in these countries face unfavorable prices relative 
to border price equivalents of the commodities they produce 
(60, pp. 12-21). In a study by Krueger et al. (41, pp. 1-5) 
it was concluded that a common characteristic of most 
agricultural pricing policies in several countries has been 
the suppression of producer prices relative to what would 
prevail in the absence of these policies. The study 
indicated that the degree to which intervention policies in 
agricultural markets achieve their intended objectives is 
often significantly less than commonly thought. In some 
instances, these policies can even achieve results opposite 
to those intended. Further, the costs ot the price 
interventions increase over time and the extent to which the 
intervention effects are achieved at all diminishes. 
A number of government policies and practices which 
create a wedge between domestic prices and their border 
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price equivalents are blamed for the suppression of domestic 
producer prices. These policies and practices include the 
following; 
1. Explicit taxation of export crops, which have the 
effect of holding domestic prices below world 
market prices to provide government revenues. 
2. The use of state marketing monopolies with power 
to set farm prices below the level that would be 
determined by competitive free market. 
3. The set of policy instruments designed to promote 
industrial production. This usually include the 
maintenance of over-valued exchange rate which 
further reduces the price of agricultural exports 
or import-competing agricultural commodities and 
the protection of industrial production through 
tariffs and other restrictions with consequence 
increase in both input prices and the cost of 
living to rural producers. 
In order to offset the effects of such government 
activities on producer incentives and income, governments in 
developing countries have sometimes increased investment in 
rural infrastructure and adopted producer price support 
programs and subsidy programs for inputs such as irrigation 
water, credit and fertilizer. 
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The general procedures that have been widely followed 
in studies analyzing the economic impacts of agricultural 
pricing and market intervention policies in developing 
countries may be summarized as follows: 
1. The determination of the extent of distortions in 
domestic product and input prices created by the 
intervention policies, and qualitative assessment 
of the incentive structure and the comparative 
advantage provided by the policies in the 
production and consumption of agricultural 
commodities. This phase of the analysis provides 
an indication of the direction in which resources 
will shift following policy interventions in 
agricultural markets. 
2. Analysis of the producer and consumer responses 
to the distorted product and input prices 
resulting from the policy interventions. These 
responses determine the basic quantitative 
outcome of the intervention policies being 
applied. 
3. The determination of the net social benefit and 
the distributional implications of the policy 
interventions. Results from here help in guiding 
judgements about the desirability of the changes 
resulting from the intervention policies. 
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4. Evaluation of the results from the analysis above 
in terms of stated policy objectives to determine 
the effectiveness of the intervention poilicies 
in achieving their objectives. Policy objectives 
that are of frequent concern to analysts include 
domestic food self-sufficiency, improved farm 
income, government revenue and foreign exchange 
earnings. 
Border prices are frequently used as reference points 
to determine the extent of distortion in domestic prices 
caused by intervention policies. The use of border prices 
as reference prices are usually justified on the grounds 
that border prices represent the opportunity cost of traded 
commodities and they are also conveniently available as they 
are observed in the international market place (3, p. 9). 
The differences between domestic commodity prices and their 
border price equivalents represents the distortion created 
in the domestic prices. The distortions can be transformed 
into protection coefficient measures^ to judge the direction 
in which the price structure created by the intervention 
policies would cause resources to be pulled between 
activities. The following protection coefficient measures 
1 For detailed discussion of the subject of protection 
coefficients see Corden (16). 
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are normally estimated for this purpose: 
1. The norminal protection coefficient (NPC) which 
is expressed as: NPCi = Pf/Pi where pf is the 
domestic price per unit of commodity i and pÇ is 
the border price per unit of commodity i. 
2. The effective protection coefficient (EPC) which 
is expressed as: EPC = V§i) where vfi 
is the value added per unit of output in the ith 
activity at domestic prices and is value 
added per unit of output in the ith activity at 
border prices. The EPC formula can be decomposed 
into its output and input components as: 
EPC = [pf - (aij.P^)] / [pÇ - Z%=i (aij.pb)] 
Where aij = quantity of the ith input used to 
produce one unit of the ith output and P^^^i(j) 
is the domestic (border) price of the ith output 
(jth input), j = l,....,k = all traded inputs, 
direct and indirect. 
In terms of the effective protection coefficient which 
provides a fuller measure of the impacts of intervention 
policies on production incentives, the following can be 
written down; 
1. An EPC > 1 means that, at the existing official 
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exchange rate, the intervention policies provide 
positive incentives to produce the commodity 
. under consideration. 
2. An EPC < 1 indicates that the intervention 
policies discriminate against the production of 
the commodity in question. 
The effective protection coefficient or expressed as a 
percentage - the effective protection rate (EPR) - can also 
be used as a measure of the impact of distortions in prices 
on factor income (62, p. 18). For example, an EPR of 0.70 
for agriculture can be interpreted as stating that primary 
factors in agriculture earn, as a consequence of domestic 
price distortions, only 70 percent of the income that they 
would earn for each unit of output under free trade. 
An explicit expression of the domestic cost advantage 
in producing commodities for the international market is the 
Domestic Resource Cost (DCR) measure. This is a basic 
efficiency measure which indicates a commodity's efficiency 
in using domestic resources to save or generate a unit of 
foreign exchange (9, p. 23). Inefficiencies in the 
production of a commodity result in a high comparative cost. 
In an ex-post sense, DRC measure can be viewed as an index 
of the social cost of maintaining specified intervention 
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policies^. The DRC measure is expressed as: 
DRCi = [2^=k+i (aij.mpp^. Py)]/[ - E^=]_(aij. 
Pt)] 
Where mpp^ is the marginal physical product of the jth input 
in its alternative use (y). Pi{y) is the border price of 
the ith (yth) output. Pj is the border price of the jth 
input. j = l,....k = traded inputs, j = k+l,...,J = inputs 
of primary, non-traded, factors. 
The calculated DRC can be compared to an accounting 
price of foreign exchange. If the DRC for a commodity is 
less than the appropriate accounting price of foreign 
exchange, a comparative cost advantage exists in producing 
the commodity. " Commodity DRC estimates show whether the 
incentive structure created by the intervention policies is 
in accordance with the comparative cost advantage principle 
in international trade. The EPC and DRC measures are both 
sensitive to changes in world or border prices. They can 
vary substantially and quickly with changes in world prices. 
Consumer decision is affected by the nominal protection 
resulting from intervention policies. Consumption will 
shift from final goods with high nominal protection towards 
2 For details on issues relating to the use of DRC in 
measuring distortions in trade caused by intervention 
policies see also Balassa and Schydlowsky (2). 
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goods with low nominal protection which also depends on 
consumption substitution elasticities. 
Producer decision is affected by the effective 
protection resulting from intervention policies. Domestic 
production will shift from low to high effective protective 
rate activities. Although the EPC and DRC measures can be 
quite useful, and indeed they have been used in several 
studies, for qualitative assessment of the effects of 
intervention policies, they do not deal with the 
quantitative impacts of intervention policies on production, 
consumption and considerations regarding employment, income 
distribution and government costs involved in maintaining 
intervention policies. Consumer and producer responses to 
the distorted prices created by intervention policies are 
needed for quantitative impact assessment of such policies. 
Consumer response to price changes are normally derived 
from utility functions which characterize preferences for 
consumer goods in both rural and urban households. Well 
developed demand models such as the linear expenditure 
system and the almost ideal demand system ((18);(64)) are 
available for econometric estimation of consumer response to 
price changes. 
The traditional approach to supply or producer response 
analysis has been to disaggregate planned output response, 
to which the supply function refers, into acreage and yield 
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responses. Attention is then focused on the measurement of 
the acreage response as an approximation to the output 
response. Approximation of planned output by acreage is 
considered reasonable and may even be the only possible 
alternative to using realized output where there is large 
discrepancy between planned and realized output and output 
data are not easily available (56, p. 66). If planned 
output is defined as acreage planted times planned yield per 
planted acre, then the elasticity of planned output with 
respect to any price is the sum of the elasticity of acreage 
and the elasticity of planned yield. Thus the elasticities 
of planned output and acreage will be the same only if the 
elasticity of yield with respect to the price in question is 
zero. Where substitution between land and other inputs such 
as labor or fertilizer is possible to a significant extent, 
yield response may be considerable and the use of acreage as 
an approximation for planned output may not be appropriate. 
Many studies on acreage response relationships have 
used the Nerlovian adjustment lag model which can be stated 
simply as (57, pp. 301-310): 
If farmers have static expectations and base their 
production plans on prices at the preceding harvest, a 
simple long-run supply function can be written as: 
Xt = a + |3Pt-i + ....+ Ut (1) 
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and given the dynamic adjustment equation below 
Xt - Xt-1 = 7(Xt - Xt-1 0 < 7 < 1 (2) 
the following equation which can be estimated statistically 
can be derived by substituting (1) into (2): 
X t  =  a 7  +  # 7 P t - l  +  ( l - 7 ) X t - l  +  7 U t  ( 3 )  
Where X^ = planned acreage. 
Pt-l = price (absolute or relative) in year t-1. 
Xt,- Xt-1 = actual acreage in year t and t-1. 
7 = coefficient of adjustment. 
Ut = error term. 
The long-run elasticity of supply may be estimated from 
the estimates of the coefficients of equation (3) by 
dividing the coefficient of current price by one minus the 
coefficient of lagged quantity. The distinction between 
short and long-run elasticity of supply becomes important 
whenever it takes time for producers to adjust to changed 
conditions. So that the full effects of a change in the 
price of a commodity are realized only after a period of 
time has elapsed. 
Once the consumer and producer response parameters are 
known, they are used in a standard Marshallian supply-demand 
framework to determine the impact of the intervention 
policies in terms of changes in consumers' and producers' 
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surpluses, economic efficiency and welfare transfers, 
government costs and foreign exchange requirements. The use 
of the concept of producer's and consumer's surpluses can be 
traced back to Dupuits analysis of the welfare effects of 
the imposition of an excise tax on consumers which was 
subsequently extended by Marshall to incorporate producers 
(17, pp. 741-799). Consumer surplus is the difference 
between the value placed upon a commodity by a consumer, the 
price that the consumer is willing to pay for the commodity 
instead of going without it, and the price that the consumer 
actually pay for it in the market. Producer's surplus is 
also a measure in money terms of the net gain to the 
producer arising from a change in opportunities open to the 
producer. The concept of consumer's and producer's 
surpluses are central in the determination of the efficiency 
gains or losses of an economic change. Efficiency increases 
as a result of a change in economic activity if the gains of 
those benefiting from the change exceed the losses of those 
made worse off when gains and losses are measured in money 
terms. In the calculation, gains and losses of consumers 
and producers resulting from the change are measured by the 
change in consumer's and producer's surpluses of those 
individuals. The concepts, of consumer's and producer's 
surpluses are illustrated in Figure 1 for a given tax 
imposed on producers. 
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Qb Qd Quantity 
(Cb) (Cd) 
FIGURE 1. Effects of a tax imposed on producers 
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In Figure 1, SS is the supply curve prior to the 
imposition of a per unit tax, AG, which raises the supply 
curve to S'S'. DD is the demand curve. Quantities supplied 
and demanded are given by Qb and Cb respectively. The 
consumer's surplus (loss) is equal to the area PdPbAE. The 
producer's surplus (loss) is equal to the area FP^EG. If 
the demand and supply curves are straight lines within the 
relevant range, the following general formulae for measuring 
the economic gains, losses and welfare transfers in respect 
of producers and consumers, and government costs resulting 
from the imposition of a tax (subsidy) can be written down; 
1. Net economic loss in consumption (NELc) 
= (1/2).(Cd-Cb(Pb-Pd) which can be 
expressed as (l/2).tcNdW where W = CdPd, tc = 
(Pb-Pd)/Pd and Nd is the elasticity of demand. 
2. Net economic loss in production (NELp) 
= (1/2).(Qb-Qd).(Pb-Pd) 
3. Welfare gain of consumers (WGc) 
= Cd(Pb~Pd) ~ NELc 
4. Welfare gain of producers (WGp) 
= Qd(Pd~Pb) ~ NELp 
5. Changes in government revenue (GR) 
= - (NELc+NELp) - WGc ~ WGp 
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Extensions of the EPC, PRC and economic surplus framework 
The EPC, DRC and the consumer's and producer's surplus 
methodologies described above are partial equilibrium 
methodologies which are useful in addressing the impacts of 
intervention policies in a single market and where producers 
and consumers may be treated as separate classes of economic 
agents. Very often there is a need to determine the impacts 
of intervention policies affecting several agricultural 
commodity markets simultaneously. Thus, consideration of 
the interrelationships among different commodity markets 
through substitution possibilities in production and 
consumption become important. 
In developing agriculture, rural-farm household operate 
simultaneously as production and consumption units.. The 
interdependence of production and consumption decisions is 
therefore of crucial importance in tracing the effects of 
intervention policies on rural-farm households. Models that 
integrate production and consumption decisions in a single 
theory of behavior are most useful in such situations. 
Agricultural markets also affect and are affected by other 
markets in the economy. Thus, the impacts of intervention 
policies in agricultural markets may not necessarily be 
localized in the agricultural sector. The above 
considerations are easily ignored in partial equilibrium 
analysis. A detailed general equilibrium framework is 
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needed to assess completely the implications of 
interventions in the agricultural sector or else where in 
the economy. 
A full general equilibrium analysis is necessarily 
complex. In order to devote sufficient attention to some of 
the issues raised above while avoiding the complexity of a 
full and detailed general equilibrium analysis, econometric 
models have been developed that extends the single market 
consumer's and producer's surplus methodology into an 
integrated multi-market framework that include some general 
equilibrium considerations^. In general terms, the 
structure of these models can be described as: 
1. Demand side, usually divided into broad domestic 
consumer groups of urban, rural non-farm and 
rural farm households. 
2. Supply side which distinguishes categories of 
agricultural producers. For example, large scale 
commercial farmers, small scale commercial 
farmers and small subsistence farmers. 
3. Equilibrium conditions which capture particular 
institutional details of the market organization 
that exists such as the competitivenes of the 
market and the forms of government intervention. 
3 See for example Choong et al. (15). 
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On the demand side, demand functions are derived from 
underlying utility functions and they may be specified 
econometrically to conform to any of the several systems of 
demand equations that can be found in the literature. The 
supply responses are derived from underlying production 
functions for agricultural products face by farm households. 
In recent years, the profit function approach^ has been 
widely used to estimate total output supply and input demand 
responses in the agricultural sector. In this study the 
profit function approach will be followed in estimating 
agricultural output supply and input responses rather than 
the acreage response approach outlined previously. Although 
the profit function approach is rather complex, it has a 
major advantage of not requiring crop by crop input data. 
All that is required is the total amount of an -input used in 
production without distinguishing the amount used for 
individual crops. Available data on agricultural inputs in 
Zambia are highly aggregated. There is no way one can 
disaggregate the available data into its unit components. 
The profit function approach provides a convenient way to 
handle the aggregated data. The profit function approach, 
however, requires accurate data. Fortunately, there is 
fairly good data on producer prices largely because of the 
^ See page 50. 
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existing administered price control system. The profit 
function approach can easily deal with a multi-crop 
production situation, allowing for a more systematic and 
theoretically sound analysis of substitution possibilities 
among crops in production. 
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POLICY CONTEXT, PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
OF PRODUCERS 
Policy Context 
Since 1980, the policy environment in Zambia has been 
characterized by continuous changes in policy. The policy 
changes have been rather rapid and dramatic in the last two 
or three years. It is hard at this point in time to 
describe the economic policy situation in Zambia in any 
definite terms. The policy changes may continue for some 
time before a definite policy direction emerges. 
The following policy review concerns the policies that 
existed throughout the 1970s and policy changes that . 
occurred before 1985. Some of these policies may still 
apply. 
General economic policies 
Exchange rate, trade and interest rate regimes 
Before June 1983 the domestic currency was tied to the 
special drawing right of the I.M.F. The exchange rate is 
currently determined by weekly auction. Throughout the 
1970s, the exchange rate and trade policies that were 
pursued tended to be biased against agricultural production. 
During this period, the exchange rate remained mostly 
overvalued (1, p. xiv) providing little flexibility for the 
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government to improve producer prices. In 1978 the domestic 
currency was devalued by 10 percent and in early 1983 it was 
again devalued by a further 20 percent. 
A system of import quotas and foreign exchange 
licensing was maintained. A specific import license which 
specified the air or surface route to be used was needed for 
each import. Import licenses attracted a levy of 5 percent 
in 1982. Priorities were set among economic sectors by the 
cabinet for the issue of licenses. Priority was given to 
imports of essential raw materials, equipment and consumer 
goods. As of 1983, 30 percent of authorized volume of 
letters of credit were reserved for imports of essential 
consumer goods, food stuff; stock feeds, fertilizer, 
petroleum products, medicines and drugs. The government is 
now planning as part of a current foreign exchange auction 
process to issue licenses automatically to the winning 
bidders for foreign exchange. In general, custom duties are 
designed to give protection and preferential pricing to 
locally manufactured goods. Foodstuff, agricultural plant 
and equipment and other capital and intermediate goods 
attracted little or no tariffs. 
The objectives of interest rate and credit policy until 
1983 were not always clearly defined. It seemed, however, 
that interest rate and credit policy were based on 
considerations which included the following (7); 
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1. Discouragement of consumption financed by credit. 
2. Encouragement of savings. 
3. Ensuring the most productive use of credit. 
Until September 1984, the government imposed a ceiling on 
interest rates. In comparison with the consumer price 
inflation, the quoted norminal interest rates before this 
time were low. The result was that real interest rates, 
nominal rates adjusted for the expected rate of inflation, 
were negative for several years. A sectorally 
differentiated loan rate structure was maintained for 
commercial bank credit. The loan rate for agriculture was 
one percentage point above the prime loan rate. The maximum 
rate for lending to the remaining sectors was three 
percentage points above the prime. Government owned credit 
institutions also maintained this loan rate structure. 
Zambia credit agencies imposed a number of fees which 
substantially raised the effective norminal rate of 
interest. These included handling charges, application 
fees, commitment fees, penalties on overdrawn loan accounts, 
and fees for local purchase orders for credit-in-kind 
transactions. It has been estimated that the effective 
nominal rates of interest may have exceeded the quoted 
nominal rates by about 2 percentage points for commercial 
banks and 5 percentage points for government owned credit 
institutions for an average size agricultural loan as a 
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result of such fees (7, p. 41). 
In September 1984, the government scrapped the ceiling 
it had imposed on interest rates and at the same time it 
limited the amount of credit that the banks could extend. 
Interest rates rose by between five and seven percentage 
points (66, p. 78). The purpose was to direct money into 
enterprises where it will be used most efficiently. -
Agricultural policy objectives 
There are several dimensions to agricultural policy in 
Zambia. These include policies which work through the price 
system, policies which directly affect the decision 
environment of producers and consumers, and policies 
regarding the institutional arrangements used to implement 
agricultural policies. Several of the agricultural policies 
can be conveniently classified as production or consumption 
policy. Policies that come under production policy include 
policies on producer prices, fertilizer subsidy, production 
bonus and interest rates on agricultural production loans. 
Consumption policies include subsidies on the processing and 
distribution of maize to consumers. Policies that directly 
affect the decision environment of producers and consumers 
include direct government participation in the production 
and distribution system such as the creation of government 
owned organizations to perform specific functions in the 
29 
agricultural sector, and the provision of service facilities 
for production and trade. For example, rural 
infrastructure, research and extension services. 
Whatever the nature of the policies in question, they 
have been formulated under a set of well defined national 
agricultural policy objectives. In the early years 
following independence, agricultural policy objectives were 
narrowly defined. The major agricultural policy objective 
then was to provide food at low prices to consumers. This 
has since been broadened and fitted into an overall national 
program for rural development. The main agricultural policy 
objectives now include (74): 
1. Achievement of self-sufficiency in the production 
of staple food and agricultural raw materials. 
2. Increased production of agricultural commodities 
with export potential to diversify exports away 
from copper. 
3. Improvement in infrastructural services related 
to increased agricultural productivity. 
4. Creation of employment and income opportunities 
in the agricultural sector to counter rural-urban 
migration. 
5. Increased contribution of agriculture to the GDP. 
6. Promotion of a more equitable distribution of 
income, for example, reducing rural-urban income 
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gap through agricultural programs and pricing 
policies. 
7. Improving nutritional status of the rural 
population. 
Although rural nutrition seems to have become a policy 
objective in its own right, there is little evidence to 
indicate that agricultural production and pricing policy-
decisions are made with nutritional considerations in mind 
Agricultural pricing and marketing policies 
In order to achieve its stated agricultural policy 
objectives, the Zambian government uses a system of 
administered prices to influence the production, 
distribution and consumption of agricultural commodities. 
The administered price system Before 1982, the 
administered price system had the following features; 
1. Prices at both the producer and consumer levels 
for major food and non-food agricultural 
commodities were fixed and controlled by the 
government. 
2. Once the prices were determined they were 
uniformly applied and maintained throughout every 
location in the entire production season. 
3. Producers of major agricultural commodities were 
obligated by law to sell to government owned 
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marketing organizations at fixed prices. 
4. Marketing organizations were not allowed profit 
margins. They had to rely on government 
subsidies to meet the expenses incurred in their 
operations. 
The features above combined to provide considerable control 
by the government over the structure of agricultural prices 
received by producers and those paid by consumers and the 
volume of trade in agricultural commodities. There were 
reported situations, however, where parallel markets had 
developed in response to high internal demand against low 
domestic supply and low official prices in some markets such 
as the market for groundnuts. 
Before 1982, prices of the following commodities were 
fixed by the government at both the producer and consumer 
levels: maize, wheat, soybean, barley, millet, cotton, 
tobacco, sorghum, paddy rice, sunflower, groundnuts, 
cassava, fertilizer. Currently, several of the fixed 
producer prices are being made to operate as floor prices. 
It is likely, however, that for crops such as cassava which 
are mainly produced by subsistence farmers without adequate 
access to alternative marketing outlets other than what is 
provided by the government, the floor prices will always be 
the effective producer price. Several consumer prices have 
been deregulated since 1982. 
32 
Government owned organizations and cooperative unions 
in agriculture There is extensive direct government 
involvement in the production and marketing of agricultural 
commodities in Zambia. Several government owned 
organizations and government sponsored cooperative unions 
are involved in the production, distribution, and processing 
of agricultural commodities as well as the provision of 
agricultural credit. 
The government organizations operating in the 
agricultural sector were created to fulfil the following 
objectives: 
1. To provide market guarantee to farmers. 
2. To maintain reasonably stable farm incomes 
through stable prices. 
3. To provide input delivery services to farmers. 
4. To generate financial surplus for reinvestment in 
agriculture or elsewhere. 
Prominent among these organizations include the 
National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD), the Zambia 
Finance Company, Tobacco Board of Zambia, the Cold Storage 
Board, and the Lint Company of Zambia. All these 
organizations operated within the administered price system. 
Some of them were granted complete monopoly powers in the 
markets they operated while others operated in a limited 
competitive setting. It has often been argued that the 
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monopoly status granted to some of the government 
organizations provided little incentives for them to operate 
efficiently (70). 
Until 1982, NAMBOARD was the sole institution 
responsible for the purchase, transportation and storage of 
maize and the distribution of fertilizer. It was also a 
major buyer of other agricultural commodities. The Lint 
company was responsible for the distribution of inputs and 
requisites and extension services to all cotton growers in 
Zambia. It was also responsible for the ginning and sales 
of lint and seeds and of small holder soybeans. In 1976 a 
price control measure was introduced which made the Cold 
Storage Board the sole buyer of cattle. The government 
determined the minimum price to be paid by the Cold Storage 
Board to beef cattle farmers. The Zambia Sugar Company 
controlled the sugar industry. The activities of this 
company included the growing and processing of sugar cane. 
Private participation in the marketing of agricultural 
commodities was largely limited to perishable food 
commodities such as vegetables and fruits. 
Agricultural subsidies 
Agricultural prices in Zambia have profound national 
budgetary implications. At least until 1983, the 
differences between producer prices and what it cost the 
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government owned marketing organizations to handle, 
transport, process and sell agricultural commodities to 
consumers were largely absorbed by the government. For 
example, there was statutory obligation on the part of the 
government to cover all losses incurred by the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board. Such losses appeared directly 
or indirectly in the national budget. 
The principal components of expenditure on agricultural 
subsidies were outlays for the handling and distribution of 
fertilizer and maize by NAMBOARD. Other agricultural 
subsidies included subsidies to cover NAMBOARD's general 
operating cost, subsidies on tobacco and cotton, and 
subsidies to the Cold Storage Board. In 1980, a total of ZK 
204.6 million was provided for subsidies to agriculture as 
compared to ZK 41.14 million in capital expenditure for the 
entire agricultural sector. In general, the subsidies 
benefited urban and high income group consumers at the 
expense of producers and availability of services essential 
to promote increased agricultural productivity. The large 
subsidies on fertilizers benefited the large scale 
commercial farmers at the expense of the small subsistence 
farmers who used little or no fertilizer (36). 
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Research and extension service 
Agricultural research constitutes a branch in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development. In 
principle, policies and priorities within research are 
determined in the National Development Plan by a committee 
in charge of agriculture and natural resource. Past 
agricultural research had been concerned with the 
introduction and selection of cash crop varieties with high 
yielding potential under favorable climatic and crop 
management conditions. Very little was done on crop and 
soil management research related to subsistence farming 
practices. Lately, however, the focus of agricultural 
research is being modified, to deal more with problems of the 
subsistence farmer. The World Bank (70, p. 17) reports that 
the following crops have received reasonable research 
attention: maize, wheat, tobacco, cotton and groundnuts. 
The average annual yields (metric tons per ha.) for maize, 
wheat, seed cotton, tobacco, groundnuts and soybeans for 
1978-1980 were reported as 2.14, 3.99, 0.52, 0.69, 1.15 and 
0.95, respectively. 
The extension service is also a branch in the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD). It has a net 
work of some 450 level agricultural camps across the 
country. Extension activities are biased toward commercial 
farm-type technology and peri-urban areas. Historical 
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factors and the introduction of hybrid maize are partly 
blamed for this situation. About 90 percent of current 
expenditures on extension is absorbed by salaries. The link 
between research and extension is weak. 
Changes in agricultural policies; 1980-83 
In the early 1980s it was recognized by the government 
that the price controll mechanism that existed was an 
inefficient means of supporting and sustaining domestic 
economic activities (4). The government made some policy 
changes which was intended to move the country towards a 
system of economic pricing of goods and services and to 
provide improved incentives for agricultural production. 
The main thrust of the policy changes was to re-organize the 
price control mechanism to enable companies and parastatal 
organizations to determine and charge economic prices for 
the goods and services they provide without the necessity 
for prior official approval except for commodities where 
prices were fixed by specific acts of parliament. For 
example, the producer price of maize, wheat and maize flour. 
Economic prices were interpreted broadly and loosely to mean 
prices that will enable enterprises to achieve sufficient 
profitability and liquidity to pay reasonable wages and 
duties levied on them, generate employment, provide 
resources for capital replacement and undertake further 
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investment (73/ p. 11). 
The policy changes included the following specific 
price, fiscal and organizational measures that affected the 
agricultural sector directly; 
(a) Prices 
1. Increased ceiling on producer prices of 
agricultural commodities. 
2. Expatriate commercial farmers producing maize 
were granted maize producer bonus in foreign 
exchange of US$ 0.50 per bag of maize over the 
first 5,000 bags delivered to an official 
marketing agency depot. 
3. The same producer bonus applied to soybeans and 
wheat for each additional bag over 1,000 and 
2,000 sold to official marketing organizations 
respectively. 
(b) Fiscal Measures 
1. Reduced government subsidies to the agricultural 
sector. 
2. Increased budgetary allocation for rural 
infrastructure such as irrigation facilities. 
3. Development allowance of 10 percent of the total 
expenditure in any change year for.the 
development of cash crops such as tea, coffee. 
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bananas and citrus fruits. 
4. Farming machinery, equipment and implements were 
to be depreciated at 50 percent of the cost of 
the asset over two years. 
5. The farming income tax rate for both individuals 
and companies reduced from 25 percent to 15 
percent. 
6. Five year tax holiday on dividends derived from 
farm income. 
7. Removal of selective employment tax on incomes of 
expatriate personnel in the agricultural sector. 
:) Organizational Measures 
1. Partial decentralization of the activities of 
NAMBOARD. The cooperative unions were assigned 
the responsibility of official purchase of maize 
and other crops at the provincial level. 
NAMBOARD retained the national responsibility for 
handling maize. 
2. Re-organization of distribution and storage 
facilities taken the responsibility away from 
NAMBOARD. 
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Agricultural Production Technology 
Domestic supply of agricultural commodities comes from 
several groups of producers. Various studies have used 
different classification schemes to group farm producers in 
Zambia. The criteria frequently used for classifying 
producers in Zambia are: 
1. The degree of commercialization (the share of 
output sold). 
2. The amount of cash inputs used. 
3. The size of land holding. 
One recent report identified the following four groups of 
producers (47): 
1. Traditional subsistence farm households. 
2. Small scale emergent farmers. 
3. Medium scale commercial farmers. 
4. Large scale commercial farmers. 
Farmers in group one cultivate 2 or less ha., use family 
labor, cultivate with hand and hoe and occasionally produce 
surplus for sale. Farmers in this group make up about 85 
percent of the total farm households in Zambia. Cassava, 
millet and maize are the staple food. 
Group two farmers produce specific cash crops 
deliberately for sale. Cash inputs are limited to 
fertilizer, casual labor and oxen or tractor hire. The size 
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of holding is 1-10 ha. Cash crops grown are maize, rice, 
beans, cotton, sunflower and groundnuts. The staple food is 
the same as for group one farmers. 
The main objective of group three farmers is production 
for the market but sufficient proportion of produce is 
retained for home consumption. Inputs are as those for 
group two plus some chemicals and additional tractor hire. 
Crops produced are maize, rice, sunflower, wheat, cotton and 
groundnuts. Farm holding is 10-40 ha. 
There is complete commercialization of production for 
group four farmers. Labor is both permanent and casual. 
They rely heavily on fertilizer and agricultural machinery. 
Food for home consumption is mostly purchased. Crops grown 
are maize, wheat, sunflower, groundnuts, soybeans and 
cotton. This group of farmers cultivate over 40 ha. and 
account for about 40 percent of the volume of marketed maize 
production. 
Several official reports and statistics on the other 
hand, normally group producers into two broad categories 
only. For example, the 1977 census of agriculture report 
classified producers as; 
1. Commercial farmers. 
2. Non-commercial farmers. 
The 1970/71 census of agriculture report (12) defined a 
commercial farmer as one who satisfied at least one of the 
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following criteria in respect of agricultural activities: 
1. A farmer who sold maize worth ZK 600 or more at 
the official prices. 
2. A farmer who grew tobacco in his own name and was 
registered with the Tobacco Board of Zambia. 
3. A farmer who sold dairy products to and was 
registered with the Dairy Produce Board. 
4. A farmer who had title to land. 
Non-commercial farmers were all persons who carried out 
agricultural activities at levels other than defined for 
commercial farmers. Generally, the official classification 
is closely tied to sales to official marketing agencies and 
ownership status of the producer. To a large extent, the 
commercial farmer category in the later classification 
coincides with groups three and four farmers in the former 
classification. The former classification of farmers appear 
more useful and complete. It is practical, however, to 
adopt the official classification because most officially 
published data are based on this classification. 
It is clear from the description above that there is 
not a uniform agricultural production technology but rather 
there, exist a spectrum of technology types. The subsistence 
farmer occupies the lowest technology level. The commercial 
farmer operates at the highest level of technology. The 
coexistence of the different technology types may be 
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explained by the presence of diminishing returns in the 
available inputs due to fixed factors and or the absence of 
markets for some factors. 
Major agricultural inputs 
Land There is a dual system of land administration 
in Zambia. In pre-colonial Zambia, the use of land was 
governed by a variety of customary systems of land tenure 
which still regulate the use of most of the land of Zambia. 
During the colonial period a major dualism was introduced 
into Zambian land tenure arrangements. A distinction was 
made between crown land which was set aside for white 
settlers under English land law, and Trust and reserved 
lands which were worked by native Zambians under customary 
land tenure. After independence crown land became state 
land. A land act in 1975 converted all freehold titles in 
Zambia into statutory leaseholds with a term of 100 years. 
Historically state lands are used for commercial 
farming. After independence many of the settler farmers 
left and the Zambian government stepped in with a variety of 
programs to keep the commercial farm lands in production. 
Title to state land is vested in the President. This 
authority is, however, delegated to the commissioner for 
lands. Rent under state land leases has been set at a 
nominal ZK 0.08 per hectare. Compensation upon termination 
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or expiry of leasehold is only to be for the unexhausted 
value of improvements. Land itself is transferred from one 
leaseholder to another without any compensation. Thus, iz 
is often said that in Zambia land as such in its natural 
form is considered free. The value of land arises from the 
cost incurred on its clearing, fencing and other permanent 
improvements. 
The administration of reserve land - allocation and use 
- is governed by customary law administered by traditional 
authorities. Land under customary law may or may not be 
readily transferable. Customary land tenure does appear to 
some extent to provide inadequate security in the 
expectation of regaining the benefits of investments in 
enhancing the productivity of existing holding or bringing 
new lands under cultivation. 
For economic reasons like access to markets and credit, 
even if the tenure arrangements in the reserve lands offer 
sufficient security, the cost of access to such lands may 
outweigh the security benefits. Thus, reserve lands may not 
be easily available for cultivation. 
About half the total cropped area is under chitemene 
(slash and burn) system of cultivation. Consequently, 
because of the relatively long period of fallow the total 
area required for cropping is much larger than the area 
actually under crops. Although, there is land pressure in 
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some limited areas land is not considered a real bottleneck 
in production. 
Labor About 83 percent of the total area under 
crops is worked by hand without the use of draft power as 
against 11 percent using animal draft power and 6 percent 
using tractors. The critical labor periods for the non­
commercial farm sector is planting time in November and 
December. The critical labor period for commercial farmers 
is harvesting time. This is because most harvesting is done 
manually. Agricultural wage rates are fixed between the 
Zambia Federation of Employers Association and the National 
Union of Plantation and Agricultural workers. To the basic 
wage an employer may add cost of living allowance, bonuses, 
welfare and transportation allowance. In 1984 casual labor 
was paid the basic wage of about ZK 1.35 a day. Wage 
employees in the agricultural sector generally do not exceed 
4 percent of the rural labor force. Some 78 percent of the 
total rural labor force consists of traditional farmers (26, 
p. 52). Since the critical labor period for the non­
commercial farm sector is early in the growing season there 
are possibilities for labor transfer from the non-commercial 
farm sector to the commercial farm sector during the 
harvesting season. 
Fertilizer About 70 percent of annual fertilizer 
needs are met through imports. Ammonium nitrate is the only 
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locally produced fertilizer. It is estimated that for the 
last ten years fertilizer consumption increased at an annual 
rate of 8 percent. Usage of other chemicals varies widely 
among farmers and from year to year depending on crop 
conditions and availability of chemicals. The government of 
Zambia tries to stock a minimum of national fertilizer 
requirements roughly equivalent to 30 percent of the 
previous years sales (29, p. 12). In reality, however, it 
maintains a much larger inventory of fertilizer. The 
underlying reasons for maintaining a large inventory of 
fertilizer are foreign exchange shortages which limit the 
ability of the government to import fertilizers and internal 
transportation and delivery bottlenecks. 
It is estimated that maize absorbs about 75-80 percent 
of total fertilizer consumption in Zambia. Tobacco accounts 
for slightly under 5 percent and sugar slightly more than 5 
percent of total fertilizer used. 
Capital There is practically no data on capital use 
in the agricultural sector. It is well known that the non­
commercial farmer uses very little capital - only small hand 
tools and some animal draft power. The capital stock of 
commercial farmers include buildings, tractors, agricultural 
implements for land preparation and planting, electrical 
installations and water facilities. 
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Market Behavior of Producers 
The previous characterization of producers give some 
indications of differences in market behavior among the 
various groups of producers. In general, commercial farmers 
are market oriented and have production plans based on 
economic considerations within the prevailing pricing 
system. The response of these producers to prices is no 
different from what it will be in an uncontrolled market. 
What is different is that consumer demand does not directly 
affect the prices they face and therefore on their supply 
decisions in the same way as would be in an uncontrolled 
market. The objective of profit maximization seems 
consistent with the market behavior of commercial farmers in 
Zambia. 
Non-commercial farmers working on a very small scale 
concentrate much of their activities on meeting their 
domestic needs for food. They depend on other off farm 
activities which may include wage employment in farming to 
meet their cash requirements for additional food and non­
food purposes. À high proportion of their production is 
retained on the farm for family consumption. Any surplus 
over domestic requirement is normally marketed soon after 
harvest. The price system which does not reflect seasonal 
scarcity discourages farm level storage over long periods. 
Out of a total of about 8.24 million bags of maize produced 
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in the 1970/71 production season, about 36 percent was sold 
or battered. The remaining was retained for home 
consumption and possible future sales. In the same growing 
season about 76 percent of total sorghum and 82 percent of 
total millet produced by the non-commercial farmers were 
retained for home consumption. These figures show that non­
commercial farmers consume most of their produce. 
It will be wrong, however, to think that non-commercial 
farmers base their production decision solely on their food 
needs. There is sufficient evidence to show that over the 
years non-commercial farmers have shifted to a great extent 
from production of their traditional staple food of millet, 
sorghum and cassava to maize production largely in response 
to the relative profitability of maize production resulting 
from the government's pricing policy. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that profitability consideration is an 
important element in the decision framework of non­
commercial producers as well. It appears appropriate to 
think of non-commercial farmers as behaving as if they try 
to maximize profits after meeting their domestic needs for 
food. 
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to examine the impact of the government's 
agricultural pricing policies on production and the 
achievement of stated agricultural policy objectives, it is 
necessary to develop a framework that establishes 
relationships among relevant policy instruments and 
production variables, provides a means of measuring the real 
and monetary impacts of policy changes on production and 
related activities, and helps to determine the contribution 
of policy changes in meeting the government's policy 
objectives. 
Two broad components of the production sector will be 
distinguished in developing such a framework: 
1. The price system. 
2. The supply system. 
The Price System 
Price is frequently the major tool used by the 
government via monopoly government marketing and production 
boards to influence and control the production and 
distribution of agricultural commodities in Zambia. 
Price changes affect producer behavior both"in terms of 
the response of agricultural output at the farm level, and 
in terms of the surplus marketed. Changes in producer 
behavior results in changes in the pattern of allocation of 
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resources, farm incomes and the volume of trade at the farm 
level. 
Changes in agricultural prices in Zambia also have 
important national budgetary and cash flow implications for 
the operations of the state owned marketing and production 
boards^. 
Although the government has in recent years adopted a 
more free market posture, the state owned organizations in 
the agricultural sector are still central to the operation 
of the price system in the markets for agricultural 
commodities. A convenient place to start looking at the 
price system is therefore the operations of these 
organizations in the markets for agricultural commodities. 
Marketing Boards Operations 
The marketing system relies on adjustments in imports, 
exports and changes in domestic stocks, rather than prices, 
to bring supply and demand in line when there is a shortfall 
in supply or demand. It will be assumed that this 
adjustment mechanism works well although in recent years 
foreign exchange shortages, a growing black market and 
substantial food aid^ seem to indicate that it may no longer 
5 See pp. 32-33 for details on the activities of the 
state owned institutions in the agricultural sector, and 
agricultural subsidies resulting from the pricing policies 
pursued. 
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be easy for the government to use imports to keep the market 
in balance when there is a shortfall in domestic supply. 
For any marketing year, the state marketing boards operating 
around given set of prices use the external market, 
including food aid, and domestic inventory to keep 
agricultural markets in balance. The following identity 
holds ; 
NIMP = DCR + [END.STOCK - BEG.STOCK] - DP 
DP = domestic production in period t. 
NIMP = net imports in period t which may include food 
aid. 
BEG.STOCK = beginning stocks in period t. 
END.STOCK = ending stocks in period t. 
DCR = domestic consumption requirement in period t. 
The operating surplus or deficit (11) on a unit of 
commodity traded by the marketing organizations can be 
expressed as: 
n = R - c 
Where R is the unit revenue or selling price of the 
commodity and C is the unit cost incurred in the 
6 In 1983 for example, UNDP reported that Zambia 
received about $32,641,419 worth of wheat, maize, flour, 
dairy products and other food products in aid. See World 
Bank (71. 83). 
51  
transaction. 
The cost component, C, consists of the basic 
procurement price (Pp), taxes paid or subsidies received (t) 
and marketing charges (M). The marketing charges include 
transportation, handling and administrative charges. A 
positive value for H indicates an operating surplus and a 
negative value an operating deficit or loss. 
The above relation can be re-expressed as: 
n =  P s  —  P p  - t - M (1) 
Suppose the commodity under consideration is both imported 
and purchased from domestic producers for the domestic 
market, then the combined surplus or deficit from marketing 
Boards' operations can be written down as: 
Total profit = Qd^Hd + Ql.Iïi (2a) 
Where IID = unit profit on pure domestic operations (sales of 
commodities from domestic supply sources). 
Ill = unit profit on imports. 
Qd = quantity from domestic sources. 
Ql = quantity imported. 
The unit profit ( I T )  on the combined operations is given 
as: 
I I '  = (Total prof it)/(QD+Qi ) 
= aCPg-Pp-TD-Mo] + j3[Ps-P^-Ti-Mi ] (2b) 
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Where a = QD/(QD+QI)« 
/3 = QI/(QD+QI) • 
Ps = unit selling price of commodity. 
Pp = unit producer price of commodity. 
pb = unit border or world price of commodity. 
M = marketing charges, T = taxes, subscripts D and I 
refer to domestic and imports respectively. 
Equation 2b can be simplified by redefining pb to include 
transportation and marketing charges and assuming T is 
negligible as: 
n' = a[Ps-Pp-MD] + P[Ps-Pb] (2c) 
If the exchange rate, e, is defined as the number of 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, then the 
following relation holds: 
pb = e.pw 
Where P^ is the c.i.f. or f.o.b price in foreign currency of 
the commodity involved. Equation (2c) then becomes: 
n' = a[Ps-Pp-MD] + p[Ps-e.pw] (2d) 
Similarly, the unit profit where output from domestic 
sources are both exported and sold locally can be written 
down as: 
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n' = a[Ps-Pp-MD] + |3[e.pv-pp] (3) 
The special case where all domestic production are 
exported or all domestic requirement comes from imports can 
be derived from equations (2d) and (3) by simply setting a 
equal to zero and equal to one. In Zambia, the operating 
deficit and marketing charges are absorbed by the 
government. Thus, the item (IT) has important national 
budgetary implications. 
Flexibility in changing producer prices 
From the view point of producer price incentives, it is 
the price received and paid by producers for output and 
inputs that are of interest. .To focus attention on producer 
prices, the price relations (2d) and (3) can be re-written 
as : 
Where the values for the variables PG , MD , HD, e, and a are 
given. 
The first term on the right hand side of the equations 
above is the pure domestic side of boards' activities. The 
second term on the right hand side of the equations is the 
external side of boards' operations. It shows the extent to 
P p  =  [ P s - ( M D + n D ) ]  +  (  | 3 / a )  [  ( P s - e . P ^ ) - n i  ]  (2d' ) 
P p  =  a [ P s - ( M D + n D ) ]  +  ^ [ e . p w - n i ]  (3' ) 
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which the external operations can potentially be used to 
support domestic producer prices. The price relations show 
that the producer price can be changed internally through a 
combination of changes in Pg, MD, IID, III , e, a or /3 
There is often great political concern about internal 
consumer prices and the government is typically reluctant to 
increase it. It has already been pointed out that the 
marketing boards frequently operate at a loss and are kept 
functioning by subsidies from general budget revenue. So, 
there is no surplus from board's activities that can 
potentially be used to support domestic producer price 
increases. It appears from past trend of Boards' activities 
that the prospects of significant improvements in marketing 
efficiency which can provide some leeway in improving 
producer prices in the near future are limited. The 
government therefore has very limited flexibility in 
increasing producer prices. A change in the exchange rate 
can be used to change producer prices. It is clear from the 
price relations above that for an importable commodity an 
exchange rate change will be effective in changing producer 
prices when the selling price is allowed to change along 
with it. Commodities which are produced only for the 
external market, however, can benefit from exchange rate 
change without the concern about increases in internal 
consumer prices. Although, the agricultural sector by 
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itself may not provide sufficient justification for changing 
the exchange rate. 
The Supply System 
In modelling the supply system, it will be assumed that 
there is a uniform production technology for all producers 
and the production side of the agricultural sector is 
independent of the consumption side of the agricultural 
sector. This assumption makes it possible to focus 
attention on the production side alone without the 
complications of the consumption side. Later, the model 
will be extended to deal with the existence of two or more 
distinct production technology types and the fact that for 
subsistence producers the choice of output and input 
quantities may be influenced by their consumption decisions. 
The production model 
The model is first formulated based on very simple set 
of assumptions precluding the presence of intermediate 
inputs and joint production. The assumptions are then 
relaxed to take into account intermediate inputs and joint 
production. The following are the initial set of 
assumptions : 
1. The production sector produces I final goods 
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using N fixed primary factors. 
2. There is no joint production and no intermediate 
inputs. 
3. Input and output prices are given. 
4. The economy is a price taker in world market. 
5. There are large number of agricultural producers. 
Suppose each product i is produced according to the 
production function 
y i  = fi(Xi) 
Where Xi = (Xji,XNi) and the fixed output prices, 
input prices and primary resources are represented by the 
vectors : 
P = (Pi, ,Pl ) 
W = (Wi, ,WN) 
V = (Vl, ,VN) 
If it is assumed that f^ is an industry production function 
the vector of industry outputs can be represented as; 
y = (yi, ,yi) 
If each of the firms in the industry has the same non-
increasing returns to scale production function and there is 
freedom of entry and exit at zero cost, the relationship 
between industry output and inputs can be approximated by 
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the constant returns to scale production fuction. So, 
fi(Xi) is linearly homogeneous concave function of Xj >0. 
If each industry i in the production sector is assumed to 
maximize profits then competitive equilibrium requires the 
following conditions to hold; 
Pif^(Xi) - W < 0 
Where f^XXi) is a vector of marginal products in industry i. 
Since the industry has the option of producing nothing, 
there is an additional condition requiring profits (11) to be 
non-negative: 
n = > 0 
Which implies that Xi[Pif^(Xi)-W] = 0 for any yi = f^XXi) > 
0 will maximize profits. 
Factor market equilibrium conditions are needed to 
complete the production model. The market equilibrium 
conditions for the factors are: 
2^=1(XNi) - Vn < 0 
Zi=l (WNXNi) - WNVN = 0 
The production sector is in equilibrium if y satisfy the 
competitive equilibrium conditions as well as the factor 
market equilibrium conditions. The equilibrium conditions 
can be solved for the endogenous vectors: 
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y = y(P, W, V) 
X = X(P, W, V) 
Intermediate inputs and joint outputs 
The basic model above can easily be extended to take 
into account intermediate inputs. The production function 
can be modified as: 
g i  =  f i ( X i ,  g i )  
the output gi is then interpreted as gross output since some 
of the product i may be used as an input in the production 
of product i. The previous notation, y, now represents net 
output of product i by the production sector. The net 
output y may be positive, in which case it is an output, or 
negative in which case it is an intermediate or other 
variable input. 
To deal with joint production, the industry can be 
thought of as a production process which can be described by 
a technology set Ti. The boundary of this set is the 
transformation frontier which is written implicitly as: 
ti(yi, -Xi) = 0 
Using the transformation frontier function, conditions 
similar in interpretation to the single product case can be 
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derived (32). In this case, yi becomes I-dimensional vector 
of net outputs of goods and Xi is N-dimensional vector of 
inputs of primary factors. 
It is more convenient to work with a profit or revenue 
function as opposed to solving explicitly the competitive 
market and factor equilibrium conditions above. The 
principle of duality (63) makes it possible to derive a 
system of demand and supply equations consistent with 
optimizing behavior of the producer simply by 
differentiating a profit function. Thus, a profit function 
such as defined below will be used to describe the 
production technology: 
R(P, V) = maxgi{Pg|(g, V) feasible} 
Where R is profit and P is a vector of output and input 
prices. Quantities of outputs and inputs are represented by 
g and fixed inputs are represented by V. 
Duality principle and the profit function 
An important duality exist between the technology of a 
firm and profit or revenue functions. McFadden (44, pp. 
81-93) has established that a technology satisfying certain 
regularity conditions yields a profit or revenue function 
with the properties that the vector of partial derivatives 
of this function, when it exists, equals a unique profit 
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maximization commodity bundle y. Further, the technology 
can be completely recovered from a knowledge of the profit 
or revenue function when certain additional conditions are 
satisfied. Conversely, a function with the properties of a 
profit or revenue function will yield, via the additional 
conditions, a technology satisfying the first conditions and 
that this technology can return the original function. 
For the technology set Ti a corresponding generalized 
profit function can be written down as: 
R(P, V) = maxyifPy: y e T (V)} 
Where y s (yi, ,yi) denotes the variable inputs and 
outputs and V = (VI, ,Vn) denotes the fixed inputs. 
T(V) is a set of net outputs y that can be produced with the 
endowment vector V. 
Properties of the profit function 
It has been shown that if the technology set (T) 
satisfies the following conditions; 
1. T is a closed, non-empty subset of I+N 
dimensional space. 
2. T is a convex set. 
3. If Z' e T, Z" < Z', then Z" e T. 
4. If (y; v) e T, then the components of y are 
bounded from above for fixed V. 
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and the profit function is defined as above, and P > 0, R(P, 
V) is well defined and satisfies the conditions below (20); 
1. Non-negative real-valued function defined for all 
positive prices, p. 
2. Monotonicity; the profit function is a non-
decreasing function of output prices and non-
increasing function of input prices. 
3. Continuity: the profit function is continuous in 
p. 
4. Convexity: the profit function is a convex 
function for every fixed v. 
5. Homogeneity: the profit function is linear and 
homogenous in p. 
6. Concave and continuous in v for every fixed p. 
If it is assumed that R(P, V) is twice differentiable 
then the following can be written down: 
(a) 9R/9Pi = yi i = 1,....,I+N (Hotellings Lemma) 
(b) 32R/3Pi9Pj = 92R/3Pj9Pi = 9yi/9Pj = (9yj/3Pi) 
(Symmetry) 
The fundamental theorem showing the relationship 
between profit function and the choice of input and output 
quantities is the Hotellings Lemma (34). The theorem is 
systematically described in terms of cost and production 
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functions by Shephard (63). Suppose a production surface is 
given as: 
0(U, Xi, X2f.««.fXn) - 1 (3) 
Where U is the output and X the factor of production. For 
given factor prices (Pi, ,Pn) the cost function below 
can be specified: 
q(cost) = zÇ (PiXi) (b) 
For given rates of output costs are minimized if the 
following necessary conditions are satisfied: 
Pi = X(90/9Xi) (c) 
0(U, Xi, ,Xn) = 1 
Where X depends in general on U, Pi, ,Pn. Equation (c) 
determines the rates of X, given by equation (d) below, at 
which the factors are used to satisfy equation (a) and 
minimize equation (b): 
X* = f|(U, Pi, ,Pn) 
(d) 
\* = X*(U, Pi, ,Pn) 
The minimum value of cost is then defined by: 
q*(U, Pi, ,Pn) = 2Pif*(U, Pi, ,Pn) (e) 
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From (e) it can be showned that the following set of 
equations hold (63): 
9q*/9Pi = f* 
(f) 
Sq/au = -XO0/9U) fi 
and q*(U, Pi, ,Pn) = A(U, Pi, ,Pn) (g) 
Comparison of (d), (f) and (g) shows that between the 
variables Xi [ i=l, ... ,n], X, Pi [ i=ln] and LJ the 
following set of equations are dual to relation (c): 
Xi = 9qi/3Pi (i=l, 2,.,n) 
X = q(U, Pi, ,Pn) 
Similar relations as above hold for a profit function and 
output supply and input demand functions. 
Econometric application of the profit function 
For econometric application of the profit function, a 
specific functional form satisfying the conditions stated 
before must be specified. One functional form which has 
been frequently applied is the translog function. The 
translog functional form can provide a second order 
approximation to an arbitrary twice differentiable profit 
function which satisfies the conditions stated before (38). 
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A generalized translog profit function can be specified 
as : 
In R(P, V) = ttQ + sjailn Pi + 1/22^ (^h^ih InPiln Ph) 
+ zl (zJSij InPiVj) + 7jlnVj 
+ 1/2Z% (^jklnVjlnVk) 
i , h = 1, . .. , I 
j , k = 1,. . . ,N 
The translog profit function is homogenous of degree one in 
p if the following hold: 
(i) Zai = 1 
(ii) Zifih = 0 
( iii ) Zhl3ih = 0 
(iv) Siôij = 0 
(v) Zjôij = 0 
(vi) Zj7j = 1 
(vii) Zj0jk = 0 
(viii) Zk@jk = 0 
Hotteling's lemma can be applied to the translog revenue 
function to yield the following system of net supply share 
functions : 
+ Si(P,V) = Pi.Odn R(P,V))/3Pi) = ai + sj PihlnPh + 
zj(ÔijlnVj) 
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Where Si(P, V) = Pi.yi(P, V)/R(P, V) is the ith commodity 
net supply share. The negative sign represents intermediate 
and other variable inputs. 
Elasticities for the choice variables can easily be 
derived from the share equations above. For example, the 
own-price elasticity (eii) for the choice variables can be 
derived by totally differentiating the share equations and 
expressing the results as follows: 
(d(Piyi/R))/dln Pi = gii 
or eii = /3ii/Si + Si - 1 
Similarly, the cross-price elasticities for the choice 
variables can be written down as: 
^ ih = 0ih/Si + Sh 
Determining output supply and input demand levels 
The share equations provide parameters sufficient for 
obtaining output supply and input demand elasticities as 
demonstrated above. From the definition of the profit 
shares, it is clear that determining absolute output supply 
and input demand levels for given set of prices and fixed 
inputs will require information on profit level in addition 
to the profit shares. Thus estimation of the profit 
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function itself is needed along with the share equations in 
obtaining absolute output supply and input demand levels. 
However, addition of the translog profit function to the 
system of share equations rapidly increases the number of 
parameters and the complexity of the model to be estimated. 
In order to reduce the complexity of estimating a large 
system of equations, only the share equations were estimated 
in this study. As a result, absolute output supply and 
input demand levels are determined in a less direct way. 
Using the estimated elasticities, changes in output supply 
and input demand are predicted for relevant set of prices 
which are then added to a base level output supply and input 
demand to obtain the required output supply and input demand 
levels. For this purpose, the share equations can be 
expressed in a more convenient form by totally 
differentiating the share equations and re-arranging terms 
as: 
Ayit = yitO'fii( APit/Pito) + yito^^si^ih (APht/Phto) + 
yito2{(Sij/Si) + (Vjo/n) On/9Vj)}.AVjt/Vjto 
Where A represents change. If the interest is in predicting 
output supply and input demand levels for alternative set of 
prices in the same period as the base year, then the 
equation above xeduce-S-.t.o tJie....equation below: 
Ayi = yi.eii( APi/Pi ) + yi.Zh=ifih (APh/Ph) 
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Where changes in the fixed inputs are set to zero for a 
constant time period. 
On the other hand, if the interest is in predicting 
output supply and input demand levels t period beyond the 
base period, then changes in the fixed inputs may not be 
ignored. In this case, estimate of the profit function will 
be needed to determine the value of the last term in the 
equation. However, if the effect of prices on output supply 
and input demand greatly outweighs all other factors then 
the last term may be ignored and the predicting equation 
also reduces to the equation stated above. 
Using the Framework 
The components of the analytical framework are 
summarized below. 
1. Accounting relations 
Quantities; NIMP = DCR + [END.STOCK - BEG.STOCK] - DP 
Prices: a. Importable commodity 
Pp = [Ps-(MD+nD)] + (/3/a) . [Ps-eP^-IIi ] 
b. Exportable commodity 
Pp = a[Pc-(Mn)l + 3[ePw-nT] 
2. Behavioral relation 
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Ayi = yi.eii( APi/Pi) + yi.Z:h=lfih (APh/Ph) 
Real impacts of alternative pricing strategy 
The relations above can be used to construct a simple 
accounting matrix for the purpose of determining the real 
effects of alternative pricing strategies on the production, 
consumption and trade in commodity i. 
The following identities based on table 1 can be 
written down: 
B + C - A = D 
F + G - E = H 
E - À = I 
F - B = J 
G - C = K 
H - D  =  L  =  I +  J  +  K  
With these identities, it is only necessary to know the 
elements in three of the cells in any row or column and the 
element in the fourth cell can be determined. 
For the purpose of this study, it will be assumed that 
domestic output consumption requirement, desired changes in 
stock and domestic input supply under any given pries regime 
are known. Imports, exports, domestic output supply and 
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TABLE 1. Accounting Matrix Showing Real Impacts of Policy 
Change 
Policy DP OCR CH.STOCK NIMP 
Initial price ABC D 
(PO) 
New price E F G H 
(PÏ) 
Real change I J K L 
A, E = domestic production at the initial and new 
price levels, respectively. 
B, F = domestic consumption requirement at the initial 
and new price levels, respectively. 
C, G'= desired changes in stocks at the initial and new 
price levels, respectively. 
D, H = imports (positive value), exports (negative value) 
at the initial and new price levels, respectively. 
I, J, K, L = real changes in production, consumption, 
stocks and imports or exports, respectively. 
CH.STOCK = ending stock - beginning stock. 
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input demand are the variables to be determined. With this 
simplifying assumption, all that is required to determine 
the real changes in output supply, input demand and the 
volume of external trade resulting from a new price regime 
relative to an initial price regime is to determine the 
value of E or F in the accounting matrix. The behavioral 
relation (2) provides a means to predict the value of E or 
F. 
Monetary impacts of alternative pricing strategy 
Once the real effects of a price change have been 
determined, the physical quantities involved can be 
converted into monetary values using appropriate unit 
prices. The following monetary items are of interest in 
this study; 
1. Farm income 
2. Foreign exchange requirement 
3. Government revenue 
1. Farm income 
Farm income is defined in this study as gross revenue 
from total farm output less total fertilizer expenditure. 
Changes in farm income can be determined as follows: 
Initial farm income level = 2 (P§Ai) - Z (P^Bj) = a 
New farm income level = Z (P^Ei) - Z (P^Fj) = b 
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Change in farm income = b - a 
Where i refers to output and j refers to fertilizer. 
2. Foreign exchange requirement 
The foreign exchange requirement represents foreign 
exchange earnings from exports, expenditures or savings on 
imports needed to keep the domestic markets in balance for a 
given price regime. The foreign exchange requirement can be 
computed as follows: 
Initial foreign exchange level = Z (PYoi + P^.Dj) = a 
New foreign exchange level = S (PYHi + py.Hj) = b 
Change in foreign exchange level = b - a 
Where P^ is border price in foreign currency, i, j,. 
represents output and input respectively. 
3. Government revenue or subsidy payments 
Revenue refers to government direct tax receipts and 
direct subsidy payments. In Zambia, the relevant revenue 
item is government subsidy payments since there is little or 
no direct taxes on many agricultural activities. 
Two subsidy items are easily identified in Zambia 
Agriculture. These are fertilizer and maize marketing and 
handling subsidies. 
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Fertilizer Subsidy 
Fertilizer subsidy payments can be determined as shown 
below: 
internal handling total fertilizer 
subsidy subsidy 
Initial subsidy level H.B (E-pO).B 
New subsidy level H.F (E-pl).F 
Change in subsidy H.J (E.J)-(pl.F -
pO.B) 
Where E is the total economic cost of fertilizer, H is the 
average unit handling subsidy, P is the marketing board's 
unit selling price to farmers. 
Maize Subsidy 
Subsidy on maize occurs at two levels: 
1. Handling subsidy between producer and miller. 
2. Further subsidy between miller and consumer. 
Changes in either the handling subsidy between the producer 
and miller or the miller and the consumer can be computed as 
follows : 
Initial subsidy level = m . A 
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New subsidy level = m . E 
Change in subsidy = m . (E - A) 
Where A and E, in this case, represent official sales of 
unprocessed maize to millers or processed maize to 
consumers, m is the average unit subsidy at the miller or 
consumer level. 
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EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE SUPPLY SHARE FUNCTIONS 
It will be assumed that the profit function R(p,v) is 
an exact representation of actual profits and that any 
deviations of the shares, Si, from the profit maximizing 
shares are random. A vector of additive random normal 
errors E is specified. The share equations are re-expressed 
as: 
+ Sit = ai + Zh^ihln(Ph) + Zj5ijln{Vj) + Eit 
Where E IDN (0, pZo) and i = 1,...,I. 
since Si sum up to one, 0 will be singular and any one of 
the share equations above may be dropped. 
The matrix /3ih must be symmetric for the profit 
function to satisfy the symmetry condition?. If the profit 
function is linear and homogenous in prices, the choice and 
share equations will be homogenous of degree zero in prices. 
This property can be imposed by specifying the share 
equations with relative rather than nominal prices. Linear 
homogeneity in prices also implies that the restrictions (i, 
ii, iii) must be satisfied^. Monotonicity and convexity are 
not general properties of the translog function. The 
translog function does not necessarily satisfies the 
? See page 61. 
8 See page 64, 
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monotonicity, convexity or quasi-convexity conditions either 
locally or globally. These assumptions either have to be 
taken as maintained hypotheses or the consistency of the 
share equations with these properties must be evaluated 
after estimation of the profit function. If the estimated 
profit function is non-convex, the own and cross-price 
output supply and input demand elasticities will not have 
the theoretically expected signs and magnitudes. It has 
been pointed out that the translog function can never, 
except in trivial cases, satisfy monotonicity or convexity 
conditions over the entire positive orthant (42, p. 234). 
Although the function may not be globally valid it can 
provide an adequate local approximation to the true function 
in some regions of interest. 
Convexity of profit functions is a consequense of 
profit maximization. There are several reasons why there 
may be a failure for profit miximization to achieve exactly 
the desired marginal products of inputs. The firms 
objective function may, for example, differ from profit 
maximization which may introduce systematic biases into 
behavioral responses and into the resulting observations. 
Estimation of a system containing erroneous first order 
conditions can be expected to worsen the quality of 
estimates. 
Satisfaction of the monotonicity condition requires the 
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estimated shares to be positive. This can easily be 
verified for each observation by checking whether the 
conditions below hold; 
(sign yi) Si > 0 for all i = 1,..,I 
A necessary and sufficient condition satisfying the 
curvature condition is that the Hessian /3ih is positive 
semi-def inite. 
Model Variables 
The following are variables in the supply model: 
Prices 
1. Price of maize. 
2. Pr 
3. Pr 
4. Pr 
5. Pr 
6. Pr 
ce of sorghum. 
ce of groundnut. 
ce of Virginia tobacco. 
ce index for cotton seed and soybean. 
ce index for rice and wheat. 
7. Price of fertilizer. 
Variable quantities 
1. Maize output. 
2. Sorghum output. 
3. 'Other cereal' output (rice and wheat). 
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4. Groundnuts output. 
5. 'Other vegetable oil seed' output (soybeans and 
cottonseed). 
6. Virginia tobacco output. 
7. Fertilizer use. 
Fixed quantities 
1. Labor - the agricultural labor force is used as a 
proxy for total labor available. The 
agricultural labor force will reflect more the 
potential quantity of labor available. So, the 
assumption here is that the actual quantities of 
labor used are equal to the potential quantities. 
The stock of labor rather than number of man-
hours was used as the quantity of labor input. 
The stock of labor provides an upper bound for 
effective labor services. 
2. Cleared land, which is interpreted as an index 
for land and capital, 
3. Trend variable. 
Quantity and price indexes of 'other cereal' and 'other 
Vegetable Oil Seed' were constructed by Divisia aggregation 
of quantities and prices of rice and wheat, and soybean and 
cottonseed. The value of 'other cereal' and 'other 
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vegetable oil seed' were computed as products of the 
respective quantity and price indexes. 
The Divisia index (35, p. 107) is a weighted sum of 
growth rates where the weights are the components' share in 
total value. Suppose {Xi(t), ,Xn(t)} is the set of 
observations which are to be indexed and {Pi(t), ,Pn(t)} 
the associated price vector, then if a(t) denote the path of 
the X's over the interval [0,T], the Divisia index in its 
continuous form is given as: 
„ P (t) X (t) X (t) 
D( r )  = exp{ (Z• 1 i i i )} 
i"^ZPj(t) Xj(t) X.(t) 
Dots on variables denote derivatives with respect to time. 
D(r) is the curve described by a(t), 0 < t < T. The Divisia 
index is thus a mapping from the set of paths a(t) into the 
real line. Since the index is a line integral it depends, 
in general, on the path over which the intergration is 
taken. Under conditions where the Divisia index is path 
independent^, the Divisia index retrieves the actual values 
of the aggregating function subject to an arbitrary 
normalization in some base period. Thus, the Divisia index 
conserves, up to the normalization, all the information in 
9 See Hulten (35) for conditions necessary and 
sufficient for the Divisia index to be independent of the 
path of intergration. 
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the problem. It follows that in situations where the time 
path dependence problem is avoided, the Divisia index is at 
least as good as any other index. The discrete form of the 
Divisia index can be written down as: 
log(Dt)-log(Dt-l) = ( 1/2.[Vi,t+Vi,t-13[log( 
Xi,t)"log(Xi,t-1)]) 
Where Vi,t = (Pi,t.Xi,t) / (Z^=i(P],t X],t)) and 
(i—1,....,n). 
The point of the aggregation was to reduce the number 
of equations and hence the number of parameters that need to 
be estimated to make it easier to estimate the system of 
share equations specified. 
A total of 23 observations on prices, outputs and 
inputs use covering pre and post independence periods (1961 
to 1983) were available. The share equations were 
constrained to satisfy the symmetry and homogeneity in 
prices conditions. The equation for 'other cereal' was 
excluded from the estimation and the price index for 'other 
cereal' was used as a numeraire. The remaining system of 
equations were estimated iteratively using Zellner's 
seemingly unrelated regression estimation procedure. 
Parameter estimates using all the 23 observations were 
not satisfactory. Only few of the price coefficients were 
statistically significant at the 5 percent significance 
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level. The signs of the generated own price elasticities 
were generally inconsistent with the convexity assumption. 
Parameter estimates using post independence 
observations are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Table 2 
is based on data from 1968/83. Table 3 is based on data 
from 1970/83. In both cases, the own price coefficients are 
highly significant except for groundnuts. The R2 which 
indicates the goodness of fit of the share equations are 
generally high although that of groundnuts share equation 
using data from 1970/83 is low. The trend coefficients are 
highly significant. The signs are consistent with 
production trends which prevailed throughout the 1970s and 
the early 1980s. The profit shares predicted by the 
estimated share equations are consistent with the 
monotonicity assumption in both cases. The own price 
elasticities calculated for each observation based on Table 
2 have signs consistent with the convexity assumption of the 
profit function for the years 1973, 1974, 1977 to 1982. 
Those based on Table 3 have signs consistent with the 
convexity assumption of the profit function for the years 
1973 to 198210. Estimates of the parameters in the share 
equations, however, were found to be somewhat sensitive to 
small changes in the data samples used for estimation. 
10 See Table 25 in the Appendix for own-price elasticity 
estimates for each observation from 1973 to 1982. 
8 1  
The cross-price elasticities calculated for each 
observation varied significantly from one period to another 
although their signs remained consistent over the years. 
The relatively small output levels of crops other than maize 
mean that small errors in the output data can greatly affect 
the size of the elasticity estimates. A summary of the own 
price and cross-price elasticity estimates calculated at the 
mean values of the profit shares are presented in Table 4. 
The magnitude and sign structure of the cross-price 
elasticities are of considerable interest. They indicate 
the substitution possibilities and complementarities that 
exist among outputs and inputs in production. Comparison of 
the elasticity estimates in the first row and first column 
of Table 4 show that a change in the price of maize has 
considerable impact on the production of all the major crops 
and fertilizer use. A change in the price of any of the 
other commodities, however, has a relatively small impact on 
maize production. The apparent complementarity between 
maize and 'other vegetable oil seed' may be a reflection of 
the influence of soybeans in this group. Soybeans 
complements maize in production in Zambia. Cottonseed by 
itself is likely to be a substitute to maize in production. 
It should be indicated, however, that the cross-price 
elasticity between maize and 'other vegetable oil seed' was 
calculated based on a statistically insignificant cross-
8 2  
price coefficient estimate. The relationships among the 
production and prices of Virginia tobacco and sorghum, 
Virginia Tobacco and groundnuts are also of interest. The 
signs of the respective cross-price elasticities indicate 
that tobacco complements both sorghum and groundnuts in 
production in Zambia^. 
The implications of the structure of the cross-price 
elasticities are that the impact of a change in the price of 
maize on the production of other crops and fertilizer use 
needs to be carefully considered in pricing policy 
decisions. The focus of agricultural pricing policies in 
the past have centered primarily on increased maize 
production. The elasticity estimates indicate that a 
relatively high price for maize is likely to discourage 
production of the traditional export crops dramatically. On 
the other hand, improved producer prices for the traditional 
export crops will encourage export crop production and 
reduce maize production only marginally. The apparent 
complementarity between export crop production and food crop 
production needs to be exploited in future agricultural 
This result seems to be supported by the special 
study report (48). The report states that tobacco when 
included in crop mix reduces a farmers maize hectarage by 
about 20 percent but utilization of family labor is 
increased by over 32 percent. The improved utilization of 
labor results in increased production of other crops that 
may be in the crop mix. 
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pricing decisions. 
Comparison of Estimated Elasticities with Those from Other 
African Countries 
A summary of supply response estimates that are 
available for selected crops in other African countries are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6. Although for reasons such as 
differences in model specification, estimation procedure, 
the period of time covered by the data employed, the 
elasticity estimates presented from other African countries 
may not be directly comparable with those estimates that 
have been generated in this study, they may be useful, in 
the absence of any other estimates for Zambia, as 
provisional bench marks against which the reasonableness of 
the estimates in this study may be judged. 
It is clear from Tables 5 and 6 that there are wide 
variations in the elasticity estimates that are available on 
African agriculture. It seems, however, that the own-price 
elasticity estimates generated for maize, groundnuts and 
fertilizer in this study fall within the range of 
elasticities reported for other African countries. The own-
price elasticity generated for sorghum and tobacco in this 
study are high compared to the estimates reported for other 
African countries.. Normally, one would expect the own-price 
response for food crops such as sorghum to be lower than 
TABLE 2. Parameter Estimates of Share Equations, 1968/83 
Parameters Share 
(ij) (i) 
Maize 
(m) 
Sorghum 
(s) 
Rice & 
Wheat^ 
(rw) 
Soybean & 
Cottonseed 
(sc) 
Groundnuts 
(g) 
Virginia 
Tobacco 
(vt) 
Fertilizer 
(f) 
-14.338 ^ 
(-1.196)^ 
0.593 
( 0.265) 
-8.559 
(-0.617) 
22.253 
( 2.734) 
-7.238 
(-1.913) 
0.862 
( 0.241) 
7.428 
( 0.954) 
0.468 
(4.165) 
Gsj. -0.121 (-5.362) 
0.087 
(3.965) 
®rwj -0.008 (0.411) 
-0.041 
(3.177) 
0.049 
(1.114) 
^scj -0.021 (-0.324) 
-0.019 
(-1.247) 
-0.033 
(2.089) 
0.130 
(2.773) 
^gj -0.261 (-6.961) 
0.026 
(1.028) 
0.140 
(5.257) 
-0.093 
(-3.269) 
0.051 
(0.871) 
Gvtj -0.288 (-10.66) 
0.095 
(7.935) 
-0.115 
(-8.565) 
-0.046 
(-2.358) 
0.173 
(7.657) 
0.266 
(18.475) 
Gfj 0.232 (4.465) 
-0.028 
(-1.867) 
0.008 
(0.641) 
0.084 
(2.467) 
-0.037 
(-1.377) 
-0.086 
(-4.435) 
-0.173 
(-3.696) 
-4.033 
(-5.081) 
0.915 
(4.930) 
-0.081 
(-0.066) 
0.555 
(1.034) 
1.548 
(5.314) 
0.895 
(3.412) 
0.199 
(0.324) 
•^ild 
5.773 
(2.988) 
-0.929 
(-2.521) 
-0.734 
(0.257) 
-3.432 
(-2.563) 
-0.528 
(-0.847) 
-1.006 
(-1.665) 
0.858 
(0.652) 
^it 
0.061 
(5.000) 
-0.011 
(-4.564) 
• 0.001 
(0.064) 
0.019 
(2.559) 
-0.023 
(-5.559) 
-0.009 
(-2.652) 
-0.038 
(-4.574) 

-4.033 
(-5.081) 
0.915 
(4.930) 
-0.081 
(-0.066) 
0.555 
(1.034) 
1.548 
(5.314) 
0.895 
(3.412) 
0.199 
(0.324) 
5.773 
(2.988) 
-0.929 
(-2.521) 
-0.734 
(0.257) 
-3.432 
(-2.563) 
-0.528 
(-0.847) 
-1.006 
(-1.665) 
0.858 
(0.652) 
0.061 
(5.000) 
-0.011 
(-4.564) 
• 0.001 
(0.064) 
0.019 
(2.559) 
-0.023 
(-5.559) 
-0.009 
(-2.652) 
-0.038 
(-4.574) 
0.899 0.905 0.688 0.761 0.898 0.908 
^ Parameters derived using constraints implied by linear homogeneity and 
symmetry conditions. 
^ t-statistics are in parentheses, l=labor, ld=cleared land, t=trend. 

TABLE 3. Parameter Estimates of Share Equations, 1970/83 
Parameters 
(lj) 
Share 
(i) 
Maize 
(m) 
Sorghum 
(s) 
Rice & 
Wheat® 
(rw) 
Soybean & 
Cottonseed 
(sc) 
Groundnuts 
(g) 
Virginia 
Tobacco 
(vt) 
Fertilizer 
(f) 
a 
i 
-9.988 
(-0.741)9 
-0.495 
( 0,235) 
-10.734 22.644 
( 2.443) 
-9.271 
(-1.981) 
0.841 
( 0.205) 
8.003 
( 0.929) 
'.j 0.416 (3.155) 
-0.085 
(-3.231) 
0.077 
(3.768) 
^rwj 0.004 (0.194) 
-0.136 
(-0.945) 
0.044 
(0.799) 
^scj -0.022 (-0.304) 
-0.017 
(-1.079) 
-0.014 
(-0.813) 
0.125 
(2.334) . 
-0.246 
(-3.952) 
-0.005 
(-0.165) 
0.073 
(1.930) 
-0.087 
(-2.154) 
0.081 
(0.810) 
ft -0.299 (-8.315) 
0.072 
(4.789) 
-0.104 
(-5,325) 
-0.065 
(-2.727) 
0.219 
(6.163) 
0.267 
(12.794) 
9fj 0.232 
(3.735) 
-0.029 
(-2.025) 
0.009 
(0.647) 
0.080 
(2.048) 
-0.034 
(-1.004) 
-0.090 
(-4.080) 
-0.168 
(-3.101) 
*11 -3.742 (-3.99) 
0.684 
(3.345) 
-0.133 
(0.091) 
0.555 
(0.858) 
1.465 
(3.166) 
0.943 
(2.829) 
0.227 
(0.331) 
Gild 4.936 
(2.174) 
-0.568 
(-1.534) 
-0.558 
(-0.167) 
-3.481 
(-2.218) 
-0.193 
(-0.227) 
-1.052 
(-1.461) 
0.918 
(0.616) 
Sit 
2 
0.060 
(4.536) 
-0,008 
(-0.304) 
0.003 
(0.174) 
0.019 
(2.168) 
-0.024 
(-3.746) 
-0.011 
(-2.486) 
-0.039 
(-4.129) 

u.viv/ V J \ 6 ! i.1 J VJ-i. / 74 / 
0.232 
(3.735) 
-0.029 
(-2.025) 
0.009 
(0.647) 
0.080 
(2.048) 
-0.034 
(-1.004) 
-0.090 
(-4.080) 
-0.168 
(-3.101) 
«il -3.742 
(-3.99) 
0.684 
(3.345) 
-0.133 
(0.091) 
0.555 
(0.858) 
1.465 
(3.166) 
0.943 
(2.829) 
0.227 
(0.331) 
«ild 4.936 
(2.174) 
-0.568 
(-1.534) 
-0.558 
(-0.167) 
-3.481 
(-2.218) 
-0.193 
(-0.227) 
-1.052 
(-1.461) 
0.918 
(0.616) 
«it 0.060 
(4.536) 
-0.008 
(-0.304) 
0.003 
(0.174) 
0.019 
(2.168) 
-0.024 
(-3.746) 
-0.011 
(-2.486) 
-0.039 
(-4.129) 
R2 0.837 0.733 0.671 0.325 0.751 0.904 
Parameters derived using constraints implied by linear homogeneity and 
symmetry conditions. 
t—statistics are in parentheses, l=labor, ld=cleared land, t=trend. 
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TABLE 4. Own-price and Cross-price Elasticity Estimates^'b 
Output- Change in Price of: 
input 
Response 
Maize Sorghum Ground Other Virginia Ferti-
nuts vegetable tobacco lizer 
oil seed 
maize 0.42 -0.04 -0.19 0.06^ -0.20 -0.05 
sorghum -1.37 1.22 -0.10 -0.39 2.12 -1.08 
g-nuts -2.71 -0.08 0.85 -1.84 3.18 -1.04C 
other veg, 0.73 -0.15 -0.90 0.46 -0.62 0.60 
oil seed 
tobacco -2.25 0 . 8 9  2.33 -0.68 ' 2 . 2 5  -1.29 
fertilizer 0.34 0.14 0.16^ -0.19 0.33 -0.67 
^Elasticities estimated at the mean profit 
shares. 
^The elasticities refer to 'quantity response' 
to price changes in contrast to the more traditional 
supply response elasticities obtained via acreage response 
analysis. It has been implicitly assumed, in deriving the 
elasticities above, that farmers adjust fully to changed 
conditions without any time lag. The traditional acreage 
response models explicitly distinguishes between the 
short run and long run elasticities by allowing for 
adjustment in the length of time for which producers adjust 
to price changes. 
^Estimated with statistically insignificant 
own or cross-price coefficient at the 5 percent significance 
level. 
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TABLE 5. Supply Response in Africa with the Nerlove Model 
(Hossein and Cummings (33)) 
Crop Country Elasticity(own-price) 
short run long run 
Maize 
Maize 
Sorghum 
Sudan 
Kenya^ 
Sudan 
-traditional farms 
-modern farms 
Groundnuts 
Tobacco 
Cotton 
Sudan 
Nigeria 
Malawi 
Nigeria 
Sudan 
Nigeria 
Uganda(eastern) 0.23 
Uganda(Buganda) 0.67-0.73 
0.33-0.66 
0.95 
0 . 1 0 - 0 . 2 0  
0.50 
0.72 
0.24-0.79 
0.48 
0 . 6 0  
0.39 
0.03-0.04 
2.43 
0.23-0.31 
0.63-0.70 
0.50 
0.44 
^Maitha (45, pp. 185-186). 
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TABLE 6. Supply Response for Malawi: Multi-Market Model 
(Kircher, Singh and Squire (40)) 
Production Price Changes in: 
Response 
Maize Groundnut Cotton Tobacco Fertili­
zer 
Unfertilized 
local maize 
Improved maize 
0.30 
0.66 
-0.06 
-0.04 
r-
H
 
1—
1 
O
 O
 
O
 O
 
I 
1 
I 
o
 o
 
o
 o
 
O
 0.02 
-0.35 
Groundnut -0.22 0.70 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 
Cotton -0.18 0.00 0.39 0.00 -0.06 
Tobacco -0.14 -0.03 0.90 0.76 -0.24 
Fertilizer 1.20 0.14 0.03 0.23 -1.04 
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what has been reported in this study. It should be pointed 
out, however, that sorghum has a dual use as food and raw 
material for beer brewing in Zambia that may explain, at 
least partially, the high own-price elasticity estimate. 
The cross-price elasticities generated in this study tend to 
be high. However, in some cases, such as the response of 
fertilizer to changes in the prices of other commodities, 
the estimates generated in this study are reasonably close 
to those reported in Table 6. 
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IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE PRICING STRATEGY 
Selected Commodities 
The commodities of particular interest in this exercise 
are; 
1. Staple Food Crops; 
- Maize. 
- Sorghum. 
2. Traditional Export Crops; 
- Virginia tobacco. 
- Groundnuts. 
3. Purchased Input: 
- Fertilizer. 
Maize is a universal staple in Zambia. Maize products 
supply about 58 percent of calories, 42 percent of protein 
and 27 percent of fat consumption for all Zambia. In rural 
diets, however, the nutritional contribution of maize is 
slightly lower than the figures above. This is due to 
substantial consumption of cassava and other indigenous 
cereal such as millet and sorghum. 
Besides its use as food, sorghum is used for brewing 
beer. It is believed that beer brewing is a significant 
source of additional income to the rural population. More 
importantly, sorghum can withstand drought better than 
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maize. Drought is frequently a major problem in maize 
production in Zambia. The major maize producing areas are 
all in drought prone regions of the country. Sorghum is 
therefore a crop which can potentially provide a more stable 
supply of grains. 
Groundnut is both food crop and cash crop. It is one 
of the main sources of plant protein in Zambia. Groundnuts 
and tobacco are the traditional and only important 
agricultural export commodities. In the last few years, 
however, the country has not been able to export any 
groundnut and tobacco production has declined sharply. 
Fertilizer is a major purchased agricultural input. 
The government has traditionally encouraged the use of 
fertilizer by providing large subsidies for fertilizer. In 
recent years fertilizer and other agricultural related 
subsidies have become major deficit items in the national 
budget. 
Selected Policy Objectives 
The ultimate test of the success of the government's 
pricing policies are the extent to which the pricing 
policies help to achieve stated government objectives. The 
effects of the government pricing policies will be evaluated 
in relation to the following selected policy objectives: 
1. Staple food self-sufficiency. 
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2. Improved farm income. 
3. Export promotion. 
4. Foreign exchange savings or earnings. 
A convenient way to measure the extent to which the 
objective of food self-sufficiency is being met is to 
compute a self-sufficiency ratio. This is a ratio of 
domestic output production to domestic output requirement. 
A ratio of one and above indicates achievement of self-
sufficiency. A ratio of less than one represents shortfall 
in domestic production to meet domestic requirement. In 
Zambia, maize is the major food commodity. So, a maize 
self-sufficiency ratio will be used as an approximation to 
staple food self-sufficiency. 
Farm income is measured by deducting total direct 
production expenditure from gross farm revenue. However, 
due to poor data on the use of inputs other than 
fertilizer,12 a restricted income measure will be used. 
Farm income will be interpreted to mean gross revenue from 
all crops produced less total expenditure on fertilizer. 
Although this is not an exactly accurate measure of farm 
income, it will be considered a good approximation to a 
12 Although fertilizer consumption data in Zambia 
cannot be said to be without problems, it is the only major 
agricultural input on which more accurate information are 
available. 
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precise income measure since for many farmers in Zambia, 
fertilizer is the only major purchased input. 
The extent to which the objective of export promotion 
is being met will be described by an 'export promotion 
ratio'. This ratio will be defined as the value of exports 
divided by the value of total production where all 
quantities are valued at their border prices. À high ratio 
will indicate improved export performance and a low ratio 
will represent poor export performance. 
Foreign exchange earnings or savings resulting from a 
given pricing policy can be determined in a straightforward 
manner once the volume of exports or imports needed to keep 
the agricultural markets in balance have been determined. 
Using appropriate border prices the value of exports or 
imports can be determined as the product of quantity 
imported or exported and the respective border price. 
Determininq commodity imports and exports 
In addition to output supply and input demand which can 
be predicted using the supply model, information regarding 
domestic output consumption requirements, stock demand for 
outputs and inputs, and domestic input supply are necessary 
to determine the volume of imports or exports resulting from 
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a given pricing strategyl^. For lack of adequate and 
appropriate data on the demand side of the agricultural 
sectorl^, no formal model was build to predict the effects 
of alternative prices on domestic commodity demand. 
Instead, the following assumptions are made regarding 
domestic consumption and stock demand for maize, sorghum, 
groundnuts, Virginia tobacco and domestic supply and stock 
demand for fertilizer. 
Table 7 is a commodity balance sheet for maize 
constructed with existing data on official maize purchases 
(intake), beginning and ending official stocks of maize and 
net imports of maize. From the basic accounting identity 
between supply and demand, the domestic consumption 
requirement was determined as a residual. It will be 
assumed that the computed consumption requirement represents 
the true official market demand for maize. An estimate of 
on farm consumption of own produce will be added to the 
official market demand for maize to arrive at the total 
national demand for maize. For any given year this level of 
consumption will be assumed to be maintained under any 
pricing strategy. 
See accounting matrix. Table 1. 
See the Appendix for general description of the data 
situation in Zambia. 
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TABLE 7. Supply-Utilization Table for Maize (000s mt.) 
YearS Offi­
cial 
Intake 
Begin­
ning 
Stock 
Ending 
Stock 
Import Export Total 
Supply 
Officia: 
Market 
Demand' 
1975 527.7 220.9 231.8 39.6 18.0 538.4 538.4 
1976 714.0 231.8 244.3 25.4 8.8 718.1 718.1 
1977 689.0 244.3 251.5 407.5 67.5 1021.8 1021.8 
1978 579.6 251.5 145.6 22.4 63.0 644.9 644.9 
1979 333.6 145.6 81.4 63.0 0 460.8 460.8 
1980 377.4 81.4 53.9 294.3 0 699.2 699.2 
1981 685.0 53.9 84.7 93.5 0 747.7 747.7 
1982 510.6 84.7 87.5 . 68.8 0 576.6 576.6 
^Year runs from June to May the following year, 
bcomputed as residual. 
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TABLE 8. Supply-utilization Table for Fertilizer (000s mt.) 
Year® Domestic 
Production 
[Beg.Stock 
minus 
End.Stock]b 
Imports Official 
Market 
Demand 
1975 16.42 -40.76 160.18 135.84 
1976 18 .69 -36.65 171.07 153.20 
1977 27.28 83.26 59.66 170.20 
1978 25.67 67.92 40.57 134.16 
1979 25.84 -0.39 120.49 145.94 
1980 18.59 101.60 76.16 196.35 
1981 15.28 55.70 147.80 218.78 
1982 25.29 -16.58 209.68 218.39 
BYear runs from June to May the following year. 
^Computed as residual. 
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More realistically, one would expect the government to 
make some adjustments in prices on the consumption side 
following major price changes on the production side which 
will affect consumption requirements. Where producer prices 
are raised the expectation will be an upward adjustment in 
consumer prices which will tend to reduce domestic 
consumption. On the other hand, if producer prices are 
reduced consumer prices may be adjusted downwards which will 
tend to increase domestic consumption. Thus, maintaining a 
constant level of domestic consumption of maize under 
different pricing strategies will tend to overestimate 
import requirement when producer price of maize is increased 
relative to the existing price of maize. 
Table 8 is a supply-utilization table for fertilizer. 
The changes in stocks have been computed as residuals from a 
basic accounting identity between supply and demand. It 
will be assumed that for any year the change in stock 
represents the desired demand for fertilizer stock 
consistent with official stock policy and financial ability 
of the government to import fertilizers. This level of 
demand is further assumed to remain the same under different 
pricing strategies for any given year. 
For each year, domestic supply of fertilizer will be 
assumed to remain at their actual levels under any pricing 
strategy. 
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There are no data on domestic groundnut consumption. 
Traditionally, Zambia has been a net exporter of groundnuts. 
Domestic consumption will therefore be assumed to be equal 
to the difference between estimated production and 
officially reported volume of export. Privately or 
officially held stocks will be considered negligible. 
External trade in sorghum is limited to occasional and 
very small amounts of imports. This situation is not likely 
to change in the near.future. Domestic sorghum requirements 
will therefore be assumed to match domestic sorghum 
production under any pricing strategy. 
Tobacco is primarily grown for the external market. It 
is believed that until recently about 80 percent of domestic 
Virginia tobacco output was exported (48), Tobacco exports 
will therefore be assumed to equal to 80 percent of 
production under any pricing regime. 
Alternative Pricing Strategies 
There are several pricing strategies which the 
government of Zambia may pursue to achieve its stated 
agricultural policy Objectives. Different pricing 
strategies will affect government policy objectives 
differently, providing the basis for judging the performance 
of the existing pricing regime. For this purpose, the 
following alternative pricing strategies relative to the 
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actual pricing regime will be considered; 
1. Strategy A; Producer equivalent import-export 
parity pricing for the major commodities - maize, 
sorghum, groundnuts, Virginia tobacco, 
fertilizer. 
2. Strategy B; Producer equivalent import-export 
parity pricing for the traditional export crops 
only - Virginia tobacco, groundnuts. 
3. Strategy C; Producer equivalent import-export 
parity pricing for the traditional export crops 
and the imported input, fertilizer. 
4. Strategy D; Improved incentive pricing for maize 
only. Increase producer price of maize by 20 
percent. 
5. Strategy E; Reduction in fertilizer subsidy. 
Increase fertilizer price by 42 percent. 
6. Strategy F; Decrease fertilizer price by 20 
percent. 
From 1975 to 1980 subsidy payments on fertilizer by the 
government to cover internal marketing and handling charges 
amounted to an average of 42 percent of the farm gate price 
of fertilizer each year (47). The marketing and handling 
subsidies on fertilizer is an expense item which the 
government can be reasonably expected to eliminate. Looking 
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at recent market prices for fertilizer and the long history 
of fertilizer subsidies in Zambia, the government may be 
willing to maintain some subsidies on fertilizer for some 
years to come. For the purpose under consideration, it will 
be assumed that the fertilizer pricing strategy consists of 
42 percent increase in fertilizer price (elimination of all 
marketing and handling subsidies) and 20 percent reduction 
in fertilizer prices. The maize pricing strategy will be 
assumed to be 20 percent increase in maize price relative to 
the existing price. 
Table 9 below shows producer equivalent import-export 
parity prices for selected commodities in Zambia. 
Pattern of output., supply and input demand 
Output supply and input demand generated by the supply 
modelas under producer equivalent import-export parity 
pricing regime for all the major crops are presented 
graphically in Figures 1 to 5 for the years 1973 to 1982. 
The graphs compare the actual output supply and input demand 
at the existing prices with output supply and input demand 
at the producer equivalent import-export parity prices. 
Embedded in the equations used in generating the 
predicted production patterns are the elasticity estimates 
given in Table 4. In all the predicting equations, cross-
price elasticities derived with insignificant price 
coefficients were ignored. 
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TABLE 9. Producer Equivalent Import-Export Parity Prices® 
(Dodge (24)) 
Year Maize Sorghum Groundnut 
(Kwacha/metric ton) 
V. Tobacco Ferti­
lizer 
1973 42.00 84.70 266.50 859.40 61.48 
1974 57.52b 95.00 356.00 1015.43 92.95 
1975 75.80 98.04b 322.00 1132.77 148.80 
1976 83.60 101.22b 511.40 1000.00 246.05 
1977 89.11 90.42b 446.10 1430.00 195.85 
1978 89.11 104.03b 529.00 1630.00 267.70 
1979 89.11 125.OOb 469.00 1530.00 283.45 
1980 118.75 154.93 306.10 1981.68 331.68 
1981 136.29 166.54 • 432.91 2460.19 392.69 
1982 120.56 151.67 281.31 2988.90 406.47 
^Prices for groundnut, tobacco and maize 
(1973-1975) are export parity prices. All other prices 
are import parity prices. 
^These figures and those for 1980-1982, except for 
fertilizer prices, were computed by the author using 
trade statistics from I.M.F. (37). F.O.B. U.S. Gulf Port 
prices for maize, sorghum, tobacco and F.O.B. London price 
for groundnuts in U.S. dollars were adjusted for 
insurance and freight charges to obtain appropriate parity 
prices (Lusaka). See the Appendix for the insurance and 
freight factors used for the adjustment. 
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In comparison with the producer equivalent import-
export parity pricing strategy for all crops and fertilizer, 
the existing price structure resulted in over production of 
maize for all years (Fig. 1), under production of Virginia 
tobacco for all years except 1980 (Fig.3), excessive use of 
fertilizer from 1974 to 1982 (Fig. 5) and underproduction of 
groundnuts for all years from 1973 to 1982. There is a 
clear pattern of under production of sorghum under the 
existing price structure from 1979 to 1982. Between 1973 
and 1977, production of sorghum under both pricing 
strategies fluctuated widely. However, a clear pattern of 
under production of sorghum under the actual pricing 
strategy emerged after 1977. 
Real and Monetary Effects of the Pricing Strategies 
The effects of the selected pricing strategies on 
government policy objectives have been presented in Table 
10. The reference year is 1981. The policy variables are 
the fixed producer prices, fertilizer subsidies. 
Information are presented on output supply, input demand, 
changes in commodity stocks, imports and exports of 
agricultural commodities, foreign exchange contribution, 
farm income, export promotion, maize self-sufficiency and 
government subsidy payments (fertilizer). 
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Strategy A 
Production of all crops other than maize increased 
relative to the actual production levels. Although the 
price of groundnuts under Strategy A decreased relative to 
the actual price level, groundnut production increased due 
to lower price of maize, a substitute crop, and higher price 
for tobacco which complements groundnuts in production. 
Higher fertilizer price results in substantial decrease in 
fertilizer demand. Exports of groundnuts and tobacco are 
increased, fertilizer imports reduced and maize imports 
increased relative to the actual levels. There are 
reductions in farm income and maize self-sufficiency ratios. 
However, the government saves foreign exchange and reduces 
subsidy payments on fertilizer. 
Strategy B 
Production of all crops except maize are higher than 
the actual levels under Strategy B. Maize production is 
relatively higher than that of Strategy A due to the higher 
maize price. The lower production of groundnuts relative to 
Strategy A is due to the higher maize price. Fertilizer 
demand is increased relative to the actual level due to the 
increase in tobacco production. The self-sufficiency ratio 
reduces resulting in increased maize imports. The export 
promotion ratio indicates a slightly better export promotion 
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performance over that of Strategy A. There is substantial 
increase in foreign exchange expenditure, government subsidy 
payments and a slightly reduced farm income. 
Strategy C 
There is an increase in groundnuts production, slight 
increase in sorghum production, and lower production of 
maize and tobacco relative to the actual production levels. 
The increase in the price of tobacco was over-shadowed by 
the large increase in fertilizer price causing the reduction 
in tobacco production. Maize self-sufficiency ratio dropped 
significantly resulting in increased maize imports. 
However, the sharp reduction in fertilizer imports produced 
substantial savings in foreign exchange relative to the 
actual situation. Farm income is lower than the actual 
income level. Export performance is relatively better than 
the actual situation. 
Strategies D. E, F 
Strategies D, E and F together show the relative 
results of using fertilizer subsidy and maize price as 
policy tools in achieving the selected government 
objectives. 
For the objective of food self-sufficiency, Strategy F 
is only slightly better than the actual situation. However, 
Strategy D nearly eliminates maize imports with the same 
GN 
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proportional increase in maize price as the increase in 
fertilizer subsidy in F. Under Strategy E, maize self-
sufficiency decreased relative to those of D, F and the 
actual situation. Export promotion improves in F relative 
to D and E both of which are worse than the actual 
situation. Although, maize imports are high under Strategy 
E relative to D, F and the actual situation, the sharp 
reduction in fertilizer demand results in substantial 
overall savii^gs in foreign exchange relative to D, F and the 
actual situation. The total foreign exchange needed to 
maintain Strategy F is substantially higher than that of 
Strategy D. In terms of government subsidy payments on 
fertilizer. Strategy D results in much higher payments than 
F which in turn is slightly worse than that of Strategy E. 
With regards to farm income Strategy D results in the 
best outcome followed by Strategy F and Strategy E. Both 
Strategies D and F result in relatively higher income than 
the actual pricing strategy. 
Ranking of the Pricing Strategies and Relationships Among 
Government Policy Objectives 
Table 11 ranks the pricing strategies according to the 
extent to which the stated policy objectives are met. The 
rows represent the policy objectives. The column numbers 
indicate the relative rankings of the pricing strategies in 
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terms of how best they meet the stated policy objectives. 
In each row, a lower column number represents a better 
ranking. Thus, column one is the best result and column 
seven represents the worst result in terms of achievement of 
the stated policy objectives. The letters in the cells 
represent the pricing strategies. 
The column positions of the pricing strategies reveal 
relationships among the policy objectives. Consider the 
pair of policy objectives below: 
1. Maize self-sufficiency and export promotion: 
Relative to the actual pricing strategy (I), 
Strategy D resulted in increased maize self-
sufficiency ratio but generated a lower export 
promotion ratio. Pricing Strategies A, B, C on 
the other hand increased export promotion ratio 
but reduced the maize self-sufficiency ratio. 
Pricing Strategy ,F increased both maize self-
sufficiency and export promotion ratios while 
Strategy E reduced both maize self-sufficiency 
and export promotion ratios. There is a conflict 
between the objective of maize self-sufficiency 
and export promotion under pricing Strategies A, 
B, C and D. Thus, increased maize self-
sufficiency ratio implies reduced export 
TABLE 10. Results of Pricing Strategies® 
Pricing Strategies : 
Actual A B C D E F 
Producer 
prices (k/mt) 
maize 148.89 136. 29 148 .89 148 .89 178. 66 148. 39 148. 89 
sorghum 99.90 166. 54 99 .90 99 .90 99. 90 99. 90 99. 90 
groundnuts 508.75 432. 91 432 .91 432 .91 508. 75 508. 75 508. 75 
V. tobacco 1650.00 2460. 19 2460 .19 2460 .19 1650. 00 1650. 00 1650. 00 
fertilizer 210.00 392. 69 210 .00 392 .69 210. 00 298. 20 168. 00 
Domestic output 
production (OOOmt) 
maize 1087.00 896. 12 1011 .04 963 .75 1178. 31 1064. 17 1097. 87 
sorghum 20.52 41. 67 41 .88 22 . 60 14. 89 11. 21 24. 95 
groundnuts 3.81 10. 15 9 .27 9 .27 1. 74 3. 81 3. 81 
V. tobacco 2.31 3. 27 4 .05 1 .45 1. 26 1. 05 2. 90 
Domestic input 
production (OOOmt) 
fertilizer 15.20 15. 20 15 .20 15 .20 15. 20 15. 20 15. 20 
^Negative numbers represent exports, foreign exchange 
earnings, withdrawal from stocks, respectively. 
TABLE 10 (continued) 
Pricing Strategies; 
Actual A B C D E F 
Domestic output 
requirement (OOOmt) 
maize; 
own produce 402.00 
(farm family) 
402 .00 402 .00 402.00 402 .00 402 .00 402 .DC 
market demand 747.70 747 .70 747 .70 747.70 747 .70 747 .70 747 .7( 
sorghum 20.52 41 .67 41 .88 22.60 14 .89 11 .21 24 .9Î 
groundnuts 3.52 3 .52 3 .52 3.52 3 .52 3 .52 3 .5: 
V. tobacco 0.46 0 . 65 0 .81 0.29 0 .25 0 .21 0 .5( 
Domestic input 
demand (OOmt) 
fertilizer 218.78 140. 84 254. 23 126.70 233. 65 157. 21 248, 09 
Official stock 
chanqes (OOOmt) 
maize 30.80 30. 80 30. 80 30.80 30. 80 30. 80 30. 80 
fertilizer -55.70 -55. 70 -55. 70 -55.70 -55. 70 -55. 70 -55. 70 
Net imports (OOOmt) 
maize 33.50 284. 38 169. 46 216.75 2. 19 116. 33 82. 63 
sorghum 0.0 0. 0 0. 0 0.0 0. 0 • 0. 0 0. 0 
groundnuts -0.28 -6. 63 -6. 03 -5.75 1. 78 -0. 29 -0. 29 
V. tobacco -1.84 -2. 61 -3. 24 -1.16 -1. 01 -0. 84 -2. 32 
fertilizer 147.80 69. 94 183. 33 55.80 162. 75 86. 31 177. 19 
TABLE 10. (continued) 
Pricing Strategies : 
Actual A B C D E F 
Foreign exchange 
contribution (km) 
maize 12.74 38. 75 23.09 29.54 0 .29 15. 85 11.26 
sorghum 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0. 0 0.0 
groundnuts -0.12 -2. 87 -2.61 -2.48 0 .77 -0. 12 -0.12 
V. tobacco -4.52 -6. 42 -7.97 -2.85 -2 .48 -2. 06 -5.70 
fertilizer 53.02 27. 45 71.97 21.90 63 .89 33. 88 69.56 
Net(total) 66.12 56. 91 84.48 46.19 62 .47 47. 55 75.00 
Farm income 
Revenue 
maize 
( km) 
161.84 122. 13 150.53 143.49 210 .51 158. 44 163.46 
sorghum 2.04 6. 93 4.18 2.25 1 .48 1. 11 2.49 
groundnuts 1.93 4. 39 4.01 4.01 0 .88 1. 93 1.93 
V. tobacco 3.81 8. 04 9.96 3.59 2 .09 1. 73 4.78 
total 
Expenditure 
fertilizer 
169.62 
45.94 
141. 
55. 
49 
29 
168.68 
53.38 
153.34 
49.75 
214 
49 
.96 
.06 
163. 
46. 
21 
88 
172.66 
41.67 
Income 123.68 86. 20 115.30 103.59 165 .90 116. 33 130.99 
Fertilizer subsidy (km) 
marketing and handling 
subsidy 19.29 12. 42 22.42 11.17 20 .60 13. 86 21.88 
total fertiliser 
subsidy 59.24 38. ,14 68.85 34.31 63 .27 • 42. 57 45.30 
Export promotion 
ratio(percent) 2.9 8. ,7 8.8 5.3 2 .3 2. 1 3.5 
Maize self-sufficiency 
ratio(percent) 92 75 85 81 99 90 93 
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promotion ratio and vice versa. Under pricing 
Strategies E and F the two policy objectives move 
together in the same direction. Improved maize 
self-sufficiency ratio, for example, imply 
improved export promotion ratio. 
Maize self-sufficiency and farm income; The 
column positions of the pricing strategies are 
identical in the two rows representing the 
objectives of maize self-sufficiency and farm 
income. Therefore, the rankings of the pricing 
strategies in terms of achieving the two policy 
objectives are the same with the two objectives 
moving together in the same direction. Maize is 
grown by all farmers in Zambia. It is easily the 
most important crop both in terms of acreage 
planted and share in the value of total marketed 
agricultural production in Zambia. Maize 
accounts for over 90 percent of the total value 
of marketed agricultural production. A pricing 
strategy that increases maize production is 
therefore likely to improve aggregate farm 
income; 
Export Promotion and Foreign Exchange 
Contribution; Pricing Strategies A and C 
improved export promotion and also resulted in 
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TABLE 11. Ranking of Pricing Strategies 
Objectives 
1 2 3 
Rankings 
4 5 6 7 
Maize Self-Sufficiency Ratio D F I E B C A 
Export Promotion Ratio B A C F I E D 
Increased Farm Income D F I E B C A 
Fertilizer Subsidy Payments C A E I D F B 
Foreign Exchange Contribution C E A D I F B 
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increased savings and earnings in foreign 
exchange. On the other hand, pricing Strategies 
E and D reduced the export promotion ratio but 
increased foreign exchange savings and or 
earnings. Pricing Strategies B and F improved 
the export promotion ratio but worsened the 
foreign exchange earnings and or savings. Thus, 
the two policy objectives are complementary under 
pricing Strategies A and C and conflict with each 
other under pricing Strategies B, D, E, F. It is 
interesting to note that a pricing strategy that 
promotes export crop production may not 
necessarily improve the foreign exchange earnings 
or savings situation. The reasons are two fold 
besides possible external fluctuations in prices. 
First, the volume of export crop production is so 
low at current levels that foreign exchange 
earned from them has little or no significant 
effect on the overall foreign exchange situation 
in the agricultural sector. Second, maize and 
fertilizer imports are the major items 
controlling the net foreign exchange from the 
agricultural sector. A pricing strategy which 
substantially reduces maize and fertilizer 
imports may therefore improve the foreign 
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exchange situation even if export crop production 
is impaired. 
Maize price and fertilizer subsidy as policy instruments for 
achieving the objectives of maize self-sufficiency and 
export promotion 
Table 12 shows a set of maize prices and outputs of 
maize, sorghum, groundnuts and tobacco, fertilizer demand 
and export promotion ratio consistent with the given maize 
self-sufficiency ratios and the elasticity parameters 
generated with the supply model (all other prices remaining 
constant). Table 13, on the other hand, shows fertilizer 
prices and outputs of maize, sorghum, groundnuts and 
tobacco, fertilizer demand and export promotion ratios 
consistent with the given maize self-sufficiency ratios and 
the elasticity parameters of the supply model (all other 
prices being constant). 
In Table 13, it is seen that a maize self-sufficiency 
ratio of 1 corresponds to a negative fertilizer price which 
is not economically acceptable. A maize self-sufficiency 
ratio of 0.85 or less requires sufficiently high fertilizer 
prices which result in negative demand for fertilizer. The 
relevant region to consider under fertilizer price or 
subsidy policy is the region described by maize self-
sufficiency ratios of 0.90 and 0.95. It seems clear then 
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TABLE 12. Maize Price as Policy Instrument 
Maize Export Maize Output Supply (OOOmt)^ Ferti-
Self- Promo- Price lizer 
Suffi- tien (K/mt.) use 
ciency ratio(%) M S G T (OOOmt) 
ratio(%) 
70 9.5 63.88 826.35 36.57 9.7 5.27 176.30 
75 7.8 83.13 885.37 32.93 8.31 4.60 185.92 
80 6.3 102.38 944.40 29.30 7.03 3.94 195.54 
85 4.8 121.63 1003.42 25.66 5.70 3.26 205.16 
90 3.4 140.88 1062.45 22.03 4.36 2.58 214.77 
95 2.1 160.13 1121.47 18.39 3.03 1.91 224.39 
100 0.9 179.38 1180.50 14.76 1.69 1.24 234.00 
^M = maize, S = Sorghum, G = groundnut, 
T = Virginia tobacco. 
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TABLE 13. Fertilizer Price as Policy Instrument 
Maize Export Ferti- Output Supply (000 mt.)^ Ferti-
self- promo- lizer lizer 
suffi- tien Price M S G T use 
ciency ratio(%) (K/mt.) (OOOmt) 
ratio(%) 
70 - 1217.11 826.35 - - - -ve 
75 — 989.06 885.37 - - - -ve 
80 — 760.98 944.40 — - - -ve 
85 — 532.94 1003.42 - - - -ve 
90 1.3 304.85 1062.45 10.51 3.81 0.96 152.57 
93 3.5 168.00 1097.87 24.95 3.81 2.90 248.09 
95 4.9 76.81 1121.47 34.57 3.81 4.19 311.74 
100 — ve 1180.50 — - - -
= maize, S = sorghum, G = groundnut, 
T = Virginia tobacco. 
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that given the parameters of the supply model, policy makers 
using fertilizer subsidy as the only policy instrument can 
influence maize self-sufficiency and expert promotion ratios 
within a very limited range. There is greater latitude, 
however, to influence the achievement of maize self-
sufficiency and export promotion using maize price as the 
only policy instrument. 
Figure 7 is a graphical representation of the 
relationship between the objectives of maize self-
sufficiency and export promotion under maize and fertilizer 
price (subsidy) policy instruments. With fertilizer price 
(subsidy) as policy instrument, both policy objectives move 
together in the same direction. Thus, an increase in 
fertilizer subsidy which encourages the use of fertilizer 
helps to improve maize self-sufficiency and promote 
agricultural export crop production, primarily tobacco. The 
graph shows that with maize price as the policy instrument, 
maize self-sufficiency ratio can only be increased at the 
expense of reduced export promotion ratio. This results 
from the fact that a relatively high price for maize reduces 
the production of the two traditional export crops, 
groundnuts and tobacco. Comparison of the prices of maize 
and fertilizer in Tables 12 and 13 show that it requires a 
relatively smaller percentage change in the price of maize 
than the price of fertilizer to obtain a given change in the 
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maize self-sufficiency ratio. That is, maize price as a 
policy instrument has a bigger impact on maize self-
sufficiency than using fertilizer price (subsidy) as the 
policy instrument. 
Further Model Development 
Underlying the results presented above are several and 
often simple assumptions regarding the nature of the 
existing production technology, commodity demand, the 
relationship between production and consumption decisions at 
the rural-farm household level, and government policy 
decisions on commodity stocks. Interpretation of the 
results generated above should therefore be done with care, 
taking into account all the assumptions which have been made 
in developing the analytical framework. 
In order to generate better and more reliable results 
the framework presented before has to be expanded in several 
directions. A systematic modelling of consumption and stock 
demand for the major agricultural commodities that will 
interface with the supply system is necessary to complete 
the framework. As with the supply system described earlier, 
a demand system describing domestic demand for the major 
agricultural commodities can be specified. If it is 
assumed, for example, that consumers allocate their 
expenditure in other to maximize their utility given a set 
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of prices and income, a system of demand functions for 
commodities that are consumed can be written down as 
follows : 
1. Utility Function 
U = U(P , Y) where Y = income, P = a vector of 
prices. 
2. System of n Demand Equations 
Xj = Xj(P, Y) where X = quantity demanded of 
commodity j. 
The consumers can be divided into groups reflecting some 
important characteristic of the population. By far, 
location (rural, urban) and income level (low, high) are the 
common criteria used to classify consumers into various 
consumer groups. For food crops, for example, the demand by 
a representative low income urban household can be written 
down as : 
Xju = Xju(P, Y) 
The demand from each group of consumers can be added up to 
arrive at the total demand for food: 
Dj = SXji 
Where D = total demand for food and i = ith group of 
consumers. In rural-farm households, income depends on farm 
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profits as well as non-farm income activities. Thus, income 
of rural-farm households is influenced by policies affecting 
farm profits. Income of rural-farm households can be 
written down as: 
Y = ynf + n 
Where YNF = net return from labor earnings and capital 
assets and H = total farm profits which is zero for non-farm 
households. 
It is clear from above that, in rural-farm households a 
change in the price of an agricultural commodity will affect 
demand directly through price and indirectly through income 
via its impact on farm profits. Assumptions can be made 
about the functional form of the utility function underlying 
the system of demand equations. It is then possible to 
calculate compensating variation for changes in prices which 
give a measure of the welfare change due to the changes in 
prices. The compensating variation measure can easily be 
explained starting with the indirect utility function. 
Given the following indirect utility function; 
U = U(P, Y) 
the minimum cost at which it is possible to achieve a given 
utility at given prices can be written as; 
Y = Y(P, U) 
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which is an increasing function in P and U. Suppose there 
are two prices, Pi, P2, and Pi rises from P^ to p]; with P2 
remaining constant. The compensation needed to make the 
consumer as well off as before, holding U at U^, is the 
amount equal to the change in the cost of securing LjO which 
can be expressed as; 
Y(P^, P^, U) - Y( pj, P§, UO) 
The negative of this expression is the compensating 
variation. 
The demand system represented above provides 
information on changes in quantities of commodities demanded 
as a result of changes in prices at both the individual 
groups and aggregate levels. In combination with a supply 
model, information can be generated on the welfare impacts 
of a price change as measured by the compensating variation 
for both farm and non-farm hoseholds. 
The supply model previously described can be extended 
in several respects to better reflect the existing 
production conditions in Zambia agriculture. However, two 
important issues regarding the supply model will be 
considered here. First, different technology types existing 
side by side in the agricultural sector can easily be 
observed in Zambia. The different technologies are 
associated with distinct groups of farmers who are affected 
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differently by government policies. It is therefore 
important for one to be able to say something about the 
differential impacts of policy changes on the different 
groups of farmers. For this purpose, two broad groups of 
producers using distinct technology types will be 
distinguished. These are the commercial farmers and non­
commercial farmers!^. The single technology set assumption 
that has been maintained in the supply model has to be 
modified as described below to take into account the 
existence of a dual production technology. 
Dual production technology and the profit function 
The existence of two distinct technology types in the 
production sector can be described by separate technology 
sets rather than a single technology set as before. Thus, 
two separate profit functions can be specified as previously 
defined to represent the two technology types as follows; 
Rk = Rk(P, Vk) = maxykf Pyk: Yk e T{Vk)} 
yk = (yik, ,yik) 
Vk = (Vlk, ,VNk) 
Where the subscript, k, represents technology type. 
16 See pages 39-41 for description of farm producer 
groups and farm technology in Zambia. 
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If there is no interaction between the two groups of 
producers in the sense that the use of a fixed input by 
commercial farmers is independent of the amount of the fixed 
input used by non-commercial farmers, then a separate system 
of output supply and input demand functions can be specified 
for each of them just as was done when the production 
technology was assumed to be uniform through out the 
agricultural sector. Looking at the entire agricultural 
production sector, a composite profit function can be 
specified for the two producer groups as: 
R' = ZkLiRkfP, Vk) 
With all notations as previously explained. The total 
output supply and input demand for the entire production 
sector can then be written down as: 
yi (total) = ( Rk/ Pi) = 2k=iyik(P, Vk) 
Where i = output/input. The profit, output supply and input 
demand functions for the commercial farmers can be estimated 
separately from those of the non-commercial farmers. 
If, however, there are fixed inputs which are re-
allocable between commercial and non-commercial producers, 
then the composite profit function becomes a function of the 
vector P, the total amount of the fixed input V and its 
distribution between the commercial and non-commercial 
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farmers. The composite profit function in this case can be 
specified as: 
R'(P, V, Vl) = Ri(P, Vi) + R2(P, V2=(V-Vi)) 
If the assumption of full employment of the fixed input V is 
maintained then the output supply and input demand functions 
for the commercial and non-commercial farmers are linked by 
the additional condition that the sum of the fixed input 
used by the two groups of producers must be equal to the 
total available amount of the fixed input. That is 
V = Vl + V2 
The response of output supply and input demand to price 
changes are now dependent on prices, the level and the 
distribution of the fixed inputs between the commercial and 
non-commercial farmers. The output supply and input demand 
functions for both groups of farmers must now be estimated 
together along with the condition for full employment of the 
fixed input V. One way to reduce the estimation problem 
that may result from the joint estimation situation is to 
assume a priori some kind of distribution of the fixed input 
between the commercial and the non-commercial farmers. Such 
an assumption will allow the output supply and input demand 
functions for each group of farmers to be estimated 
separately as before. The total output supply and input 
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demand functions are given as: 
yi (total) = yii(P, Vi) + yi2(P/ V2) 
The assumption that the production side is independent 
of the consumption si de.., of the agricultural sector is not 
exactly valid in the context of Zambian agriculture where 
non-commercial farmers operate largely at the subsistence 
level with production and consumption decisions being 
interrelated. The supply model can be modified to take this 
situation into account as described below^?. 
Subsistence production and the profit function 
It is well-known that among subsistence farmers, 
production objectives are typically constrained by a need 
initially to meet household food consumption needs. Thus, a 
subsistence farmer's production plan may include a minimum 
production of say X amount of commodity Y. Such a 
restriction will affect the choice of output mix and hence 
resource use in a similar fashion as a restriction on any 
other input. The minimum amount X of commodity Y that must 
be satisfied can therefore be treated as a kind of fixed 
input along with the regular fixed input V. It will then be 
Household production-consumption models specially 
designed to deal with the interrelationship between 
production and consumption decisions are widely available in 
the literature. 
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possible after estimation to test whether the minimum amount 
X of commodity Y is a binding constraint. 
Very little can be said about the way demand for stocks 
has to be modelled without adequate information on the 
government's policy decision framework and objectives 
concerning stocks. Presently, such information is lacking. 
It seems therefore that one can only make simple assumptions 
about the stock situation as has been done in this study. 
So far, nothing has been said about the implications of 
price changes on the use of inputs other than fertilizer 
such as land, labor and capital. Without doubt, one issue 
of major interest in pricing policy decisions is the amount 
of employment that can be generated by a given price policy 
choice. However, the available data on inputs other than 
fertilizer are not good and it is doubtful whether any 
useful insight can be gained by pursuing issues related to 
labor and capital use. 
It is clear that a complete analytical framework 
developed along the lines described above that will provide 
useful information on the impacts of agricultural pricing 
policies will require extensive and accurate data for 
implementation. Given the current poor data situation,18 
the need for a more systematic collection of relevant and 
18 See the Appendix for details on data problems in 
Zambia. 
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accurate economic data for such analytical work cannot be 
over emphasized. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The elasticity estimates indicate significant cross-
price relationships among the major crops grown in Zambia. 
The signs of the cross-price elasticities reveal both 
substitution possibilities as well as important 
complementarities among the major crops. For example, maize 
is a substitute crop for nearly all other major crops grown 
in Zambia and there is complementary relationship between 
tobacco and sorghum in production. The price response 
relationships between maize and its substitute crops are 
rather asymmetric. Changes in the price of maize 
substantially affect the production of all other crops and 
the use of fertilizer. On the other hand, changes in the 
prices of crops whi:^ are substitutes for maize in 
production have relatively small effect on maize production. 
Price interventions in maize markets will therefore have 
important consequences for other crop markets. In a country 
where agricultural pricing policy tends to be focused on 
maize pricing issues, this suggest that the impact of 
changes in the price of maize on other crop markets should 
be carefully considered in pricing policy decisions in other 
to achieve desirable balance in output-mix. 
The complementary relationships indicated by the 
positive cross-price elasticities between tobacco and 
sorghum, tobacco and groundnuts suggest that expansion of 
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tobacco production for the export market can be encouraged 
without undermining aggregate food supply to any 
considerable extent. Increased production of sorghum and 
groundnuts, both food crops, following an incentive pricing 
for tobacco will lessen the negative impact on food 
production that will result from reduced production of 
maize. Through its substitution relationship with maize and 
complementary relationships with sorghum and groundnut, 
tobacco production can play an important role in a program 
to diversify crop production away from the predominant 
maize-culture. 
It is significant to note that although the own-price 
elasticity estimate for groundnuts is within close range of 
estimates reported for other African countries, it was 
computed with statistically insignificant own-price 
coefficiently. This seems to suggest that groundnut 
production may not improve to any significant extent through 
incentive groundnut pricing alone. Other non-price factors 
may have to be considered along with incentive pricing if 
groundnut production should benefit from high producer 
price. The World Bank (70, pp. 25-26) states that major 
constraints in groundnut industry in Zambia include 
inadequate technical information on groundnut production. 
19 See the estimated profit share equations, pp. 84-.85. 
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The Bank further points out that the importance of 
developing appropriate technical advice for vegetable oil 
seed production is particularly vital for groundnuts, 
cottonseed and sunflower. Thus, any policy designed to 
increase groundnuts production should look beyond pricing 
issues to consider aspects of technical constraints such as 
quality of seed stock and other agronomic factors that may 
limit the farmers ability to take advantage of improved 
price incentives. 
The 'pricing strategy' results presented in Table 10 
show that the policy objectives that were considered were 
affected differently by the pricing strategies. For 
example. Strategy A which is border pricing for all 
commodities improves export promotion ratio but worsens 
maize self-sufficiency ratio relative to the actual pricing 
strategy. On the other hand. Strategy D which is improved 
incentive pricing for maize worsens expprt promotion ratio 
but improves maize self-sufficiency ratio relative to the 
actual pricing strategy. Thus, in choosing a particular 
pricing strategy, there is the issue of cost in terms of 
trade-offs among the policy objectives to be considered. 
This makes it necessary to be able to establish the relative 
importance of the policy objectives being pursued in order 
to identify the level of costs or extent of trade-offs among 
policy objectives that policy makers are willing to accept 
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for the purpose of deciding on a choice of pricing strategy. 
Although border pricing ('getting prices right') or 
some variants of it are frequently presented as the logical 
alternative to the pricing strategy actually pursued by the 
Zambian government, it is not at all clear that given the 
importance attached to maize self-sufficiency and the low 
volume of export crop production under current production 
conditions that border pricing is a preferred pricing 
strategy relative to the actual pricing strategy. The major 
advantages of border pricing seem to be improved export crop 
production and reduced expenditure on fertilizer subsidies. 
At current levels of production, the volume of the 
traditional export crop production, tobacco and groundnuts, 
is so low that higher domestic producer prices that may be 
expected with border pricing are not likely to make 
significant difference in the level of production of the 
traditional export crops. Thus, one cannot expect to see 
substantial changes in agricultural export earnings even 
under border pricing. If border pricing is seen as a 
strategy to expand foreign exchange earnings from 
agricultural experts to any significant extent then 
substantial improvements in the production conditions for 
the traditional export crops are necessary. In addition, 
new opportunities must be sought to develop other non-
traditional export crops for the export market. Major 
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constraints to increased tobacco production, the main export 
crop, include: low geographic density of people interested 
in producing tobacco, inadequate access to infrastructure 
including research and extension, lack of timely 
availability of essential inputs, and insufficient 
availability of management capability and capital (70, p. 
30). Clearly, solution to these problems which are by no 
means limited to tobacco production will require a strong 
government role at least in the form of new and increased 
investments in infrastructure and agricultural services to 
encourage more farmers to shift into both traditional and 
non-traditional export crops for external markets. 
Farm level'Domestic Resource Cost estimates for 
agricultural commodities that are available for Zambia rank 
the major crops in order of decreasing desirability in 
expansion of production to generate foreign exchange as: 
Virginia tobacco (0.43), Wheat (0.46), Maize (0.52), Soybean 
(0.56), Sorghum (0.72), Sunflower (0.82), Groundnuts (0.83), 
Millet (0.90), Seed-cotton (0.91). Although the Domestic 
Resource Cost estimates shown in brackets above indicate 
that Zambia has good potential for growing several crops, of 
which tobacco, wheat, soybeans are most promising, for the 
purpose of generating foreign exchange, there are at least 
two major issues that have to be considered. First, the 
Domestic Resource Cost estimates are based on the 
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productivities of inputs which depend on the existing 
production technology besides other factors that may be 
beyond the control of farmers. The extent to which 
production technology is improved will therefore influence 
the future competitiveness of crops grown in Zambia. To the 
extent that technology remains stagnant in the future, the 
potential to grow the above crops for the export market may 
be greatly reduced. Second, there is the problem of finding 
markets for the commodities once they are produced. 
Increased production of the traditional export crops means 
Zambia must be able to increase its market share of world 
exports of these commodities. For non-traditional export 
crops, it is even a bigger problem of finding new markets. 
The outlook for Zambia in increasing its world trade shares 
for tobacco and groundnuts, for example, does not seems to 
be favorable. Campaigns in developed countries on the 
health hazard of tobacco is likely to decrease world demand 
for tobacco. Within Africa, many of the competing suppliers 
of tobacco and groundnuts to the world market have an edge 
over Zambia which is landlocked and far from the major 
consuming countries. The extent to which intensification of 
the traditional export crops and diversification into new 
crops can be carried out to have meaningful impact on 
agricultural export earnings may therefore be limited by 
unfavorable market situation for these commodities. 
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The major items controlling net foreign exchange 
earnings from the agricultural sector are maize and 
fertilizer imports. While border pricing strategy limits 
the importation of fertilizer, it increases maize imports 
substantially resulting in a net loss of foreign exchange. 
It is clear then that border pricing strategy may not 
necessarily improve foreign exchange earnings from the 
agricultural sector. Within the scope of this study one 
cannot make any strong statements about the overall resource 
allocation effects of the border pricing strategy. The 
efficiency of resource allocation is said to be improved if 
a pricing strategy results in an increase in real income 
summed over all members in a society relative to an initial 
set of prices. If the demand side is well modelled, the 
compensating variation measure provides good estimate of 
changes in real income to both farm'and non-farm households 
following price changes. Since the demand side of the 
analysis in this study is rather weak or practically non­
existent, one can only make partial statements about changes 
in farm income resulting from price changes. The pricing 
strategy results show that border pricing for all 
commodities produced the worst aggregate farm income. Due 
to the fact that farmers grow large amounts of maize, the 
most effective way of increasing aggregate farm income is to 
improve the producer price of maize. It should be pointed 
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out that all farmers may not benefit equally from increase 
in aggregate farm income. The differential farm income 
effect of price changes needs to be considered in 
interpreting aggregate income changes resulting from such 
price changes. 
The relationship between the objectives of maize self-
sufficiency and export promotion differs according to 
whether maize price or fertilizer price (subsidy) is the 
policy instrument being used. The two objectives are in 
direct conflict when maize price is the policy instrument 
being used. On the other hand, the two objectives move 
together in the same direction when the policy instrument is 
fertilizer price or subsidy. A high fertilizer subsidy, for 
example, improves both maize self-sufficiency ratio and 
export promotion ratio while a high maize price increases 
maize self-sufficiency ratio but reduces the export 
promotion ratio. Thus, fertilizer subsidy appears to be a 
desirable policy instrument for achieving the objectives of 
maize self-sufficiency and export promotion simultaneously. 
However, it takes substantially larger changes in fertilizer 
price or subsidy relative to changes in maize price to 
achieve a given change in maize self-sufficiency. For 
example, it requires about 8 per cent increase in the 
producer price of maize relative to the actual price level 
to increase maize self-sufficiency ratio from the initial 
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level of 92 per cent to 95 per cent. The same increase in 
maize self-sufficiency ratio, however, will require about 63 
percent decrease in fertilizer price relative to the actual 
fertilizer price. The fertilizer subsidy level rises 
steeply with every percentage increase in the level of maize 
self-sufficiency. Besides the obvious cost disadvantage of 
using fertilizer subsidy to achieve the objectives of maize 
self-sufficiency and export promotion, fertilizer subsidy as 
a policy instrument can be used to influence the two policy 
objectives only within a very narrow range. 
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APPENDIX 
Data Used in the Study 
The data presented here are secondary data published by 
various government institutions and international agencies 
that were assembled together in Zambia in May 1985. 
The nature and problems of agricultural data in Zambia 
Generally, there is lack of adequate and appropriate 
time series or cross-sectional data on food and non-food 
agricultural commodity production, utilization and trade. 
For some important commodities, for example maize and 
fertilizer, where the markets are heavily regulated, there-
are reasonable information on official domestic purchases, 
imports and sales in the domestic market. 
Several distinct local institutions are involved in 
collecting and publishing data on agricultural activities in 
Zambia. Frequently, similar data reported by different 
institutions show major inconsistencies among the data. It 
does appear that there is little or no coordination among 
the institutions which collect and process agricultural 
information in Zambia. 
For a variety of reasons, publications dealing with 
agricultural data are not issued on reqular basis. It is 
not unusual to see a break of about five years between 
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consecutive issues of a publication that is supposed to be 
published annually. This results in frequent breaks in time 
series data and lack of uniformity in the set of variables 
on which statistics are collected over the years. 
The time period to which a given data corresponds is 
sometimes not clearly defined or well described. This is a 
source of difficulty in comparing data from different 
sources or even the same source at different times and in 
different publications. Using information from one data 
source to supplement information from another source becomes 
a real problem in such situations. The year 1970, for 
example may be used implicitly to refer to either of several 
time periods - the 1970 calendar year, the 1970 harvest 
year, the 1969/70 or the 1970/71 production or marketing 
year. Nevertheless, the paucity and extensive breaks in 
available data series make it necessary to piece together 
bits of information from several sources to obtain 
reasonably complete and more useful data series on Zambia 
agriculture. 
Assumptions underlying data estimates are sometimes 
hard to defend. It is therefore useful to have some idea 
about underlying assumptions of estimated data before 
putting much confidence in them. The Planning Division of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, for example, has developed 
maize crop budgets for the last few years for the commercial 
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farm sub-sector based on the assumption of a constant maize 
yield of 5040 kg. per hectar (49). Although these crop 
budgets are widely accepted and used to determine producer 
prices, the yield assumption does not reflect correctly 
economic and weather changes which significantly affect 
resource use and crop yields. 
There are often remarkable differences in data reported 
by Zambian institutions and those reported by International 
agencies such as The Food and Agricultural Organization 
(F.A.O.) and the World Bank. The World Bank (70), for 
example, reports maize imports for 1982 as 220,010 tons. 
The National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD (54)) 
which is solely responsible for importing maize into the 
country puts the figure at 125,996 metric tons. The F.A.O. 
(27) estimates total cropped land in 1979 as 5,050,000 ha. 
The Bank of Zambia (5), on the other hand, gives a figure of 
448,600 ha. for all the major crops grown in Zambia for the 
same year. Even if adjustments are made to allow for 
acreage under minor crops, it is unlikely that the F.A.O. 
and the Bank of Zambia estimates of total cropped land in 
1979 will be any where close. 
The point of all the above examples is that, the 
integrity of published data on Zambia agriculture should be 
judged with caution irrespective of the status or apparent 
credibility of the reporting institution. It is probably 
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fair to state that there is no single 'best' or 'accurate' 
source of agricultural data in Zambia. It is essential to 
compare data from all possible sources before making a 
choice among them. 
Local sources of agricultural data 
Important local institutions involved in some 
systematic collection or compilation of data on agriculture 
in Zambia include: 
1. The Planning Division, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Water Development (MAWD). 
2. The Central Statistical Office (CSO). 
3. The National Agricultural Marketing Board 
(NAMBOÀRD) and other government organizations 
such as the Nitrogen Chemical Company, the 
Tobacco Board of Zambia, the National Milling 
Company. 
4. The Rural Development Studies Bureau of the 
University of Zambia. 
T¥0 other important agricultural institutions, the 
commercial Farmers Bureau and the National Cooperative 
Federation, have plans to develop their own data bases. The 
Planning Division (MAWD) now routinely forecasts National 
crop production and develops crop budgets for the various 
groups of farmers. The Division also compiles data on 
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producer prices and quantities of agricultural commodities 
traded through official marketing channels. NAMBOARD 
compiles information on official crop purchases and sales. 
It keeps records of imports, exports and stocks of grains 
and fertilizer. CSO publishes data on various aspects of 
agricultural activities through surveys it conducts from 
time to time. 
The Bank of Zambia's annual Report and Statement of 
Account and the government's Annual Budget Address report 
provide some useful data and information on the performance 
of the agricultural sector and policy decisions affecting 
agricultural activities in Zambia. 
Country economic reports and perspective studies by 
major donor agencies such as the World Bank and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development contain valuable data 
on agricultural production, consumption, trade and prices. 
They also provide analysis of agricultural policy design and 
the performance of the agricultural sector and suggest 
desirable changes in policy focus in Zambia. 
Output and input data 
The tables below present data on the production, 
utilization and marketing of the commodities that were used 
in this study. As far as possible the sources of the data 
and any special explanations are clearly documented. 
147 
TABLE 14. Commercial Farm Production (000s mt.)3 
Yearb Wheat Maize Soybean Virginia Cotton Sorghum Ground 
tobacco seed nuts 
1961 0.49 97.3 0.05 6.73 0.01 0.55 0.18 
1962 0.61 143.0 0.11 7.32 0.02 0.84- 0.32 
1963 0.93 136.3 0.12 • 7.03 0.04 0.72 0.43 
1964 0.71 136.2 0.01 10.96 0.43 0.24 0.09 
1965 0.21 227.0 0.01 6.60 0.65 0.03 0.13 
1966 0.21 267.6 0.01 6.27 0.64 0.66 0.13 
1967 0.08 262.7 0.01 4.72 0.62 1.42 0.25 
1968 0.20 175.1 0.01 5.14 0.61 2.72 0.40 
1969 0.20 206.5 0.01 3.90 1.03 0.55 0.42 
1970 0.22 208.1 0.01 2.88 0.46 0.26 0.33 
1971 0.10 162.2 0.01 3.28 0.30 0.05 0.54 
1972 0.10 350.3 0.02 2.39 0.67 0.11 0.58 
1973 0.10 233 .1 0.02 2.29 0.42 0.02 0.26 
1974 0.10 239.7 0.25 2.10 0.17 0.16 0.27 
1975 0.20 276.9 0.09 1.97 0.21 0.05 0.52 
1976 1.01 217.4 0.20 2.25 0.31 0.53 0.76 
1977 4.07 299.6 0.18 2.01 0.71 0.40 0.60 
1978 5.42 252.0 0.27 1.33 0.67 0.41 • 0.18 
1979 6.51 181.3 0.38 1.65 1.19 0.07 0.23 
1980 7.25 273.2 2.04 1.49 1.83 0.05 0.16 
1981 11.83 402.0 1.67 0.83 1.34 0.03 0.11 
1982 14.13 277.4 5.16 0.67 1.02 0.01 0.06 
1983 20.32 288.6 2.11 0.84 2.50 0.05 0.08 
&Assembled from secondary data collected in Zambia, 
May 1985, by the author. 
byear runs from June to May the following year.  
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Documentation of sources of commercial farm data 
Maize production data from 1961 to 1976 were obtained from 
(C.S.O. (11); C.S.O. (10) and C.S.O. (12)). Maize 
production data from 1977 to 1983 were estimated by author. 
An average farm retention of 8 percent of maize produced 
computed on the basis of marketed maize production data from 
1961 to 1975 were used together with official maize intake 
data to arrive at production figures as explained below. 
Method; 
Let R, the farm retention rate of maize, be given as: 
R = FR / TP 
Where FR is the farm retention and TP is total production by 
commercial farmers. Marketed production, MP, from 
commercial farmers can then be defined as: 
MP = (1 - R) X TP 
The share of commercial farmers (S) in marketed production 
for all farmers (TMP) can be defined as: 
S = MP / TMP 
From the relations above, total production from the 
commercial farm sector can be determined as: 
TP = (S / (1 - R)) X TMP 
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Wheat production data from 1961 to 1965 were obtained 
from C.S.O. (10). Wheat production data from 1966 to 1982 
were obtained from World Bank (70). 
Soybean production data from 1961 to 1964 were obtained 
from C.S.O. (10). Soybean production data from 1971 to 1983 
were obtained from NAMBOARD (54). Official marketed 
production of soybean is assumed to be identical to total 
production of soybean. 
Groundnut production data from 1961 to 1965 were 
obtained from C.S.O. (10). Groundnut production data for 
1967, 1969, 1970, 1972 and 1974 were obtained from C.S.O. 
(11). Data for 1966, 1968, 1971, 1973 and 1975 to 1983 were 
estimated by author. The share of commercial farmers in 
total marketed production of groundnuts was estimated by the 
author to be about 8 percent for each of the years indicated 
above. Using total official marketed production of 
groundnuts data from MAWD (46) and the estimated 8 percent 
share of commercial farmers in total marketed groundnuts 
production, the volume of groundnuts marketed by commercial 
farmers was derived for each year. Marketed production of 
groundnuts by commercial farmers was assumed to be equal to 
actual groundnuts production by commercial farmers. 
Sorghum production data from 1961 to 1962 were obtained 
from C.S.O. (14). Data from 1963 to 1965 and 1967 to 1968 
were obtained from (C.S.O. (10); C.S.O. (11)). Data from 
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1969 to 1983 were estimated by the author as 50 percent of 
total official marketed production of sorghum, data obtained 
from MAWD (46). 
Cottonseed production data from 1961 to 1965 were 
obtained from C.S.O. (14). Data from 1966 to 1971 were 
obtained from C.S.O. (11). Data from 1972 to 1983 were 
estimated by the author using total official cottonseed 
intake data from MAWD (46) and assuming that commercial 
farmers account for about 8 percent of total marketed 
production of cottonseed. Marketed production of cottonseed 
was assumed to be identical to actual cottonseed production 
for commercial farmers. 
Virginia tobacco production data from 1961 to 1976 was 
obtained from (C.S.O. (10); (51)). Data from 1977 to 1983 
were estimated by the author using official marketed 
production of tobacco data from MAWD (46) and assuming a 
marketed production share of 36 percent for commercial 
farmers. Marketed production and actual production of 
tobacco were assumed to be identical for commercial farmers. 
Documentation of sources of data, non-commercial farm 
Maize production data from 1970 to 1975 and 1977 were 
obtained from C.S.O. (11). Data from 1961 to 1969 and 1979 
to 1983 were estimated by the author assuming farm retention 
rates of 64 percent and 56 percent respectively for maize. 
The method used for the estimation is as described for the 
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TABLE 15. Non-commercial Farm Production (000s mt.)^ 
Yearb  Rice Virginia Cottonseed Sorghum Maize Ground­
tobacco nuts 
1961 0.06 0.00 0.03 84.0 247.5 13.3 
1962 0.06 0.00 0.03 80.9 217.4 13.3 
1963 0.06 0.00 0.03 77.7 91.7 13.3 
1964 0.06 0.00 0.61 74.5 206.5 13.3 
1965 0.06 0.00 0.86 71.3 174.9 22.1  
1966 0.06 0.00 2.16 68.1 409.7 32.3 
1967 0.06 0.23 1.80 65.0 409.2 42.2 
1968 0.10 1.14 3.64 61.8 265.4 13.8 
1969 0.16 1.12 5.88 58.6 189.9 23.7 
1970 0.17 1.91 4.98 51.7 739.3 16.2 
1971 0.23 2-62 12.37 65.4 747.4 12.7 
1972 0.26 3.14 7.68 46.6 559.1 16.1 
1973 0.35 3.95 4.81 40.1 478.2 13.5 
1974 0.36 4.10 1.99 22.6 562.6 9.7 
1975 1.01 4.50 2.39 60.4 690.8 13.9 
1976 2.09 4.01 3.57 32.0 899.0 26.3  
1977 1.86 3.58 8.21 33.2  898.7 20.8 
1978 2.93 1.37 7.75 34.1 806.4 6.9 
1979 1.85 2.94 13.72 26.8 362.7 8.0 
1980 2.21 2.64 21.07 23.6 492.3 5.7 
1981 2.67 1.49 15.41 20.4 685.0 3.7 
1982 2.90 1.20 11.76 17.3 621.6 2.1 
1983 5.07 1.50 28.73 12.5 557.9 2.9 
^Assembled from data collected in Zambia, May 1985, 
by author. 
byear runs from June to May the following year.  
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commercial farmer sector above. 
Rice production data from 1967 to 1983 were obtained 
from MAWD (46). All other rice data were estimated by 
author by simple extrapolation. 
Groundnuts production data from 1970 to 1978 were 
obtained from C.S.O. (11). The rest of the groundnuts data 
were estimated by the author on the assumption that non­
commercial farmers contribute about 92 percent of total 
official intake of groundnuts which represents an average of 
33 percent of non-commercial farm production of groundnuts. 
Sorghum production data from 1970 to 1978 were obtained 
from C.S.O. (11). Data for 1983 were obtained from MAWD 
(50). All other sorghum data were estimated by the author 
by simple extrapolation. • 
Virginia tobacco production data from 1962 to 1971 were 
obtained from the Ministry of Rural Development (51). Data 
from 1976 to 1982 were estimated by the author as 64 percent 
of total official intake of tobacco, MAWD (46). 
Cottonseed production data from 1962 to 1971 were 
obtained from ((52); C.S.O. (11) and Bowbrick (8)). Data 
from 1972 to 1983 were estimated by the author from total 
cottonseed intake data, MAWD (46), assuming 92 percent 
market share for non-commercial farmers. 
Documentation of official intake arid sales data sources 
Official maize intake data from 1969 to 1983 were 
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TABLE 16. White Maize: Official Intake and Sales to 
Millers* 
Yearb Official Intake Official sales 
(Domestic) to Millers^ 
1960 139.4 — 
1961 152.6 -
1962 204.3 -
1963 192.9 -
1964 199.8 -
1965 259.8 -
1966 390.0 -
1967 384.0 -
1968 259.1 -
1969 263.8 289.0 
1970 134.1 338 .7 
1971 340.0 348.6 
1972 616.6 344.8 
1973 386.0 414.0 
1974 551.2 477.0 
1975 527.7 508 .8 
1976 714.0 517.0 
1977 689.0 548.9 
1978 579.6 652 .0 
1979 333.6 623.1 
1980 377.4 589.7 
1981 685.0 560 .6 
1982 510.6 512.0 
1983 458.3 461.1 
^Assembled from secondary data collected in Zambia, 
May 1985, by author. All figures are in thousands metric 
tons. 
^Year runs from June to May the following year. 
csales represent official sales by NAMBOARD. 
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obtained from NAMBOARD (54). Data from 1960 to 1968 on 
official maize intake were obtained from Ministry of Rural 
Development (52). Data on maize sales to millers from 1973 
to 1974 were obtained from NAMBOARD (54). Data on maize 
sales to millers from 1975 to 1984 were obtained from 
NAMBOARD (54). Data on maize sales to millers, 1970 and 
1979, were obtained from F.A.O. (26). 
Documentation of sources of inputs utilization data 
Land data for commercial farmers, 1967 to 1975, were 
obtained from C.S.O. (11). Land data, 1960 to 1961, for 
commercial farmers were estimated by author using indices 
data on acreage planted by commercial farmers which were 
obtained from Eliott (25). Land data for non-commercial 
farmers for 1962, and 1964 to 1980 were derived from F.A.O. 
(27). Compared to partial information on total acreage 
under crops from local publications, the F.A.O figures 
appear grossly overestimated. The F.A.O. figures were 
discounted by 60 percent to arrive at the figures presented 
which seem more reasonable. 
Labor employed by commercial farmers from 1962 to 1965 
were obtained from C.S.O. (10). Data on labor employed by 
commercial farmers, 1966 to 1971, were obtained from the 
Planning Commission (74). Data on labor employed by 
commercial farmers from 1972 to 1981 were obtained from 
C.S.O. (14). The labor data represent employment in 
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TABLE 17. White Maize; Exports and Imports^ 
Year Exports^ Imports^ Total 
Commercial Concessional 
1965 53.0 - - 0.4 
1966 44.7 - - 4.7 
1967 221.9 • —  - -
1968 77.3 - - -
1969 8.6 - - 71.0 
1970 0.1 - - 0.3 
1971 8.2 - - 0.6 
1972 1.1 - - 63.2 
1973 45.0 - - -
1974 99.0 - - 17.3 
1975 18.0 - - 39.6 
1976 8.8 - - 25.4 
1977 67.5 - - 407.5 
1978 63.0 - - 22.4 
1979 0.0 - - 63.0 
1980 0.0 171.4 122.9 294.3 
1981 0.0 59.9 33.7 93.5 
1982 0.0 60.5 8.3 68.8 
1983 0.0 41.4 84.6 126.0 
1984 0.0 73.3 70.4 143.7 
8Assembled from secondary data collected in Zambia 
in May 1985 by author. 
boata from 1973/78 obtained from NAMBOARD (54). 
Data for 1971/72, 1975 and 1979/82 obtained from 
World Bank (70). Data from 1965 to 1970 were obtained from 
the Ministry of Rural Development (52). 
CData from 1965/1973 were obtained from the Ministry of 
Rural Development (51). Data from 1974 to 1978 were 
obtained from World Bank (70). Data for 1979 to 1984 were 
obtained from NAMBOARD (54). 
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TABLE 18. Percentage Shares of Commercial and Non­
commercial Farmers in Marketed Maize Production^ 
Yearb Commercial 
Farmers (%) 
Non-commercial 
Farmers (%) 
1961 58 42 
1962 60 40 
1963 65 35 
1964 63 37 
1965 76 24 
1966 62 38 
1967 62 38 
1968 63 37 
1969 71 29 
1970 40 60 
1971 39 61 
1972 55 45 
1973 60 40 
1974 40 60 
1975 40 60 
1976 30 70 
1977 40 60 
1978 40 60 
1979 50 50 
1980 40 60 
1981 54 46 
ëAssembled from secondary data collected in 
Zambia, May 1985, by author. Data from 1973 to 1981 were 
obtained from C.S.O. (13). Data from 1960 to 1972 were 
estimated by author using maize delivery data from the 
Ministry of Rural Development (51). 
byear runs from June to May the following year.  
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TABLE 19. Inputs Utilization (National Aggregate 
Yearb Commercial Farmers Non-commercial farmers 
Labor Land Labor Land 
1962 33114 76.9 1118 1920 
1963 31983 65.7 1118 1936 
1964 24056 72.1 1118 1936 
1965 21411 73.6 1118 1944 
1966 23800 87.2 1146 1949 
1967 23470 82.6 1146 1960 
1968 23950 82.6 1146 1965 
1969 22930 64.2 1146 1976 
1970 19630 119.5 1175 1980 
1971 23386 62.9 1169 1989 
1972 24912 87.6 1169 1989 
1973 25384 89.0 1169 1989 
1974 26888 127.7 1169 1991 
1975 28880 159.3 1263 1997 
1976 26000 190.9 1335 2000 
1977 24640 162.0 1302 2000 
1978 26080 162.0 1323 2020 
1979 27672 162.0 1372 2020 
1980 26048 162.0 1394 2040 
1981 28800 162.0 • 1416 2000 
1982 28000 162.0 1416 2000 
1983 - 135.0 1416 2000 
^Assembled from secondary data collected in 
Zambia, May 1985, by author. Labor is the 
number of people employed. Land is in thousands of 
hectares. Commercial farm land is arable cleared land. 
byear runs from June to May the following 
year.  
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agriculture, forestry and fishing. The data were therefore 
discounted by 20 percent to reflect more accurately labor 
employed by commercial farmers. Non-commercial farm labor 
for 1965, 1970 and 1975 to 1981 represent the economically 
active population in agriculture which were obtained from 
F.A.O. (27). The data are being used as approximation for 
labor used by non-commercial farmers. All other.labor data 
were estimated by the author by simple extrapolation. 
Documentation of sources of price data Wheat data 
from 1965 to 1976 were obtained from World Bank (70). Data 
from 1977 to 1984 were obtained from NAMBOARD (54). 
Soybeans data from 1967 to 1976 were obtained from MAWD 
(46). Data from 1977 to 1984 were obtained from NAMBOARD 
(54) . 
Sorghum data from 1967 to 1984 were obtained from MAWD 
(46). Paddy rice data from 1968 to 1970 were obtained from 
Dodge (24). Paddy rice data from 1974 to 1984 were obtained 
f rom MAWD (46). 
Cottonseed prices are average of grades A, B, C prices 
of hand picked cotton, Lusaka ginnery. Cottonseed data were 
obtained from MAWD (46). 
Groundnuts prices are average of grades A, B, C shelled 
groundnuts prices. Groundnuts data from 1965 to 1984 were 
obtained from MAWD (46). 
Virginia tobacco data from 1961 to 1975 were obtained 
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TABLE 20. Fertilizer Supply in Zambia (000s mt. )a 
Year Local Imports b Total 
Production^ 
(Ammonia Nitroge­ Phosphate Other 
Fert.) nous & Pottash Fert. 
Fert. Fert. 
1970 6.15 - - , - -
1971 23.95 - - - -
1972 18.37 32.00 1.03 55.90 88.93 
1973 12.54 95.12 4.46 0.0 99.58 
1974 20.33 80.43 10.91 0.0 91.34 
1975 16.42 134.43 25.75 0.0 160.18 
1976 18.69 167.07 4.00 0.0 171.07 
1977 27.28 52.32 7.34 0.0 59.66 
1978 25.67 40.57 - 0.0 40.57 
1979 25.84 120.44 0.03 0.03 120.49 
1980 18.59 75.83 0.32 0.01 76.16 
1981 15.28 95.60 52.20 0.01 147.80 
1982 25.29 70.00 0.50 139.18 209.68 
1983 - 202.89 6.55 0.02 209.46 
3Assembled from secondary data collected in Zambia, 
May 1985, by author. 
^Figure for 1972 was obtained from Dodge (24). Data 
from 1973 to 1981 and 1983 were obtained from MAWD (46). 
Figure for 1982 was obtained from Di-Biase Associate (19). 
CData obtained from MAWD (46). 
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TABLE 21. Fertilizer Consumption in Zambia (000s mt.)^ 
Year Nitrogenous 
Fertilizer 
Phosphate 
& Potash 
Fertilizer 
Compound 
Fertilizer 
Total 
1961 — — — 22.79 
1962 - - — 21.88 
1963 - - - 24.28 
1964 - - - 33.41 
1965 - - - 22.93 
1966 - - - 30.99 
1967 19.06 - 22.48 41.54 
1968 16.22 - 20.09 36.31 
1969 16.26 - 20.69 36.95 
1970 26.98 3.18 26.57 55.14 
1971 30.70 2.10 61.08 93.88 
1972 45.70 1.35 67.56 114.61 
1973 33.08 1.53 51.90 86.51 
1974 51.66 3.15 49.18 103.99 
1975 57.87 1.99 75.98 135.84 
1976 66.54 7.13 79.53 153.20 
1977 76.71 1.81 91.67 170.20 
1978 51.23 2.56 78.38 134.16 
1979 62.25 4.03 81.42 145.94 
1980 84.28 3.03 112.20 196.35 
1981 94.95 9.52 118.86 218.78 
1982 106.30 9.11 126.98 218.39 
1983 70.54 2.65 92.61 165.80 
^Assembled from secondary data collected in Zambia, 
May 1985, by author. 
Data from 1961 to 1965 were obtained from C.S.O. (14). 
Data from 1967 to 1977 were obtained from Di-Biase 
Associate (19). 
Data from 1978 to 1983 were obtained from NAMBOARD (55). 
Fertilizer consumption data refer to NAMBOARD's 
fertilizer sales and may not necessarily correspond 
to amount of fertilizer actually applied on farms. 
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TABLE 22. Produce: r Pr ices for Crops (Kwacha per mt. )3 
Yearb Maize Wheat Soybeans Sorghum Paddy Rii 
1961 33 .90 — — — — 
1962 29 .60 - - - -
1963 38 .03 - - - -
1964 38 .03 - - - -
1965 36 .60 63 .27 - - -
1966 35 .94 63 .27 - - -
1967 33 .44 68 .82 41 .07 39 .18 -
1968 31 .24 68 .82 35 .52 39 .18 46 .30 
1969 34 .55 83 .25 35 .52 39 ,18 77 .20 
1970 37 .85 83 .25 35 .53 39 .18 77 .20 
1971 43 .37 83 .25 93 .24 39 .18 90 .00 
1972 47 .04 83 .25 93 .24 39 .18 110 .00 
1973 47 .04 83 .25 93 .24 52 .17 110 .00 
1974 47 .04 83 .25 146 .52 55 .50 150 .00 
1975 54 .82 155 .40 146 .52 66 .60 150 .00 
1976 68 .70 177 .60 188 .70 66 .60 180 .00 
1977 68 .70 177 .60 188 .70 66 .60 180 .00 
1978 75 .00 222 .00 188 .70 66 .60 180 .00 
1979 100 .92 222 .00 238 .65 66 .60 200 .00 
1980 128 .52 266 .40 355 .20 99 .90 225 .00 
1981 148 .89 288 .60 401 .82 99 .90 225 .00 • 
1982 176, .85 355 .20 469 .64 99 .90 350 .00 
1983 202 .41 396 .82 502 .83 177 .60 500 .00 
1984 - 471 .75 582 .75 207 .01 500 .00 
^Assembled from secondary data collected in 
Zambia, May 1985, by author. 
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TABLE 22 (continued) 
Year Cottonseed Groundnut Virginia Tobacco 
1961 — - 606.30 
1962 . - - 641.60 
1963 - - 751.80 
1964 - - 513.70 
1965 119.46 117.50 606.40 
1966 119.46 125.62 672.40 
1967 126.93 121.88 967.90 
1968 126.93 125.62 672.40 
1969 126.93 125.62 776.00 
1970 141.87 125.62 626.10 
1971 140.00 125.62 690.10 
1972 140.00 125.62 749.30 
1973 140.00 153.75 859.50 
1974 200.00 200.00 986.70 
1975 250.00 206.25 806.70 
1976 350.00 287.50 1001.20 
1977 350.00 287.50 979.10 
1978 410.00 305.00 1287.40 
1979 410.00 352.50 1510.00 
1980 410.00 390.00 1570.00 
1981 410.00 508:75 1650.00 
1982 423.33 . 575.00 2400/00 
1983 470.00 687.50 2640.53 
1984 530.00 893.75 -
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TABLE 23. Input Prices Paid by Farmers (Kwacha per mt.)^ 
Year Fertilizer 
(Kwacha per mt.) 
Farm Labor 
(Kwacha per day) 
1961 — 0.38 
1962 - 0.36 
1963 - 0.37 
1964 - 0.48 
1965 - 0.53 
1966 93.50 0.51 
1967 94.40 0.79 
1968 - 0.63 
1969 95.50 -
1970 94.70 0.55 
1971 70.12 -
1972 48.71 -
1973 61.96 0.70 
1974 74.31 -
1975 75.42 0.70 
1976 116.39 0.90 
1977 116.39 0.90 
1978 116.39 -
1979 142.78 -
1980 169,43 -
1981 210.00 1.35 
1982 282.16 1.45 
1983 461.84 2.18 
1984 518.11 3.12 
&Assembled from secondary data collected in Zambia, 
May 1985, by author. 
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from Ministry of Rural Development (51). Tobacco data from 
1976 to 1983 were obtained from MAWD (46). 
Farm labor data for 1983 to 1984 were obtained from 
MAWD (49). All other data on farm labor wages were obtained 
from the Ministry of Labor and Social Services (53). 
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TABLE 24. Exchange Rates, Insurance and Freight Factors 
Year Exchange Rate^ Insurance and Freight 
Factors^ 
1973 0. 648 0.24 
1974 0. 643 0.25 
1975 0. 643 0.23 
1976 0. 721 0.21 
1977 0.789 0.17 
1978 0.813 0.20 
1979 0.792 0.21 
1980 0.788 0.20 
1981 0.869 0.20 
1982 0.928 0.20 
^These are cross-exchange rates computed by 
author using data from I.M.F. ("37). 
^Calculated as the ratio of the difference between 
the c.i.f. values of imports for the given years 
by author. 
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TABLE 25. Own-price Elasticity Estimates^ 
Year Maize Sorghum Virginia 
Tobacco 
Ground­
nuts 
Soybean 
C.seed 
Ferti­
lizer 
1973 0.36 0.39 0.96 0.66 2.63 -0.27 
1974 0.40 1.14 0.95 0.53 1.48 -0.04 
1975 0.38 0.55 2.19 0.78 1.92 -0.19 
1976 0.36 0.73 1.19 0.02 0.97 -0 .39  
1977 0.41 2.00 3.00 2.40 0.17 -0.62 
1978 0.40 1.57 1.89 0.38 0.25 -0.68 
1979 0.41 2.06 2.30 0.44 0.06 -0.73 
1980 0.48 1.75 6.96 3.71 0.16 -0.78 
1981 0.51 2.07 5.97 7.53 0.06 -0.91 
1982 0.55 2.40 4.53 1.10 0.03 -1.07 
^Elasticity estimates for groundnuts are based on 
own-price coefficient which is statistically insignificant at 
the 95 percent confidence level. All other elasticity 
estimates are based on own-price coefficients which are 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level. 
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